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 Abstract 
Cape Town’s MyCiTi Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) service is part of an ambitious plan to 
integrate various modes of transport and “place at least 75% of Cape Town’s population 
within 500 meter of the system”. MyCiTi would replace the ubiquitous mini-taxis on most 
major routes. The scheduled public bus service began in the city in 2010, and has since 
expanded considerably through the phased roll-out of several new routes, the most recent 
being one that reaches the Cape Flats. Yet in the early stages, there was considerable 
opposition from various stakeholders and some of that still continues. This research looks at 
how key stakeholders shifted their views over the period 2008-2015. Three stakeholder 
groups and their interactive dynamics in the context of ongoing uncertainty about the system 
are explored in this mini-thesis. The findings show that despite much pre-planning, the 
MyCiTi project has been negotiated and re-negotiated as the City embarked on a voyage into 
uncharted territory. The transformation of sections of the taxi industry from the informal 
sector to the formal sector has been presented as a big challenge but has also been seen as its 
biggest phase one success so far.  Yet, in 2015, the city blamed at least half of its revenue 
shortfall on having to compete with the minibus taxi industry, which it failed to “contain” as 
planned.  The mini-thesis shows that mega-public-private projects are messy at best and that 
without effective monitoring, public support and consultation the best laid plans and policies 
can fail.  More research is needed into the complexities of public private partnerships and the 
City needs to take such knowledge into the next phases.  
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  Chapter 1:  Rationale, aims and background 
Since the 1980’s road-based commuter services have been served by buses and minibus taxis 
(Behrens, 2009; Schalekamp, 2009). The bus industry is generally characterized as “formal”, 
and provides scheduled, subsidised public transport services. The minibus taxi industry on the 
other hand is informal and provides on demand services and does not receive any operating 
subsidies.  
The Bus Rapid Transport System (BRT) is a national government initiative.  In his 2006 Budget 
Speech the then Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel noted that investment in public transport is an 
important step in reshaping the urban landscape.  The state’s vision was to replace the previous 
inadequate, ineffective and unsafe transport model. The specific ideal of public transport as a 
national political and economic priority for big cities has thus come to the fore. As it is well 
known, taxi operators and private interests have generally tended to resist proposals for public 
transport. I aim to do a critical inquiry into the evolution of the Integrated Rapid Transport 
system (IRT) in Cape Town, also known as MyCiTi Bus, focussing on major issues and 
stakeholder views over the last five years (2008-2014). I examine how stakeholders have 
significantly shifted their views as the “MyCiTi model” has itself evolved and new issues have 
emerged.    
Academic literature on transport in South Africa is skewed toward technical and economic 
issues (Schalekamp, 2009). The historical literature covers the rise of the taxi industry and 
transport privatisation (McCaul, 1990). Pinkerton (2002) comments on the political transition 
and shows how blacks became economically empowered through the minibus taxi industry.  A 
number of Masters theses have been recently written on Johannesburg’s BRT. Boudreaux 
(2006) conducted her research on South African minibus taxi industry and its economic 
developments and focuses on how it affects minibus drivers.  
An inquiry into MyCiTi is needed because the system operates in a highly contested 
environment where a number of divergent interests have to be catered for and aligned. In South 
African cities over the last decades we have many suburban residents invested in using private 
cars, while in the poor areas people use walk, cycle, or use a minibus, or commuter train (Barrett 
2001). On the other hand, apartheid policies located black people on the margins of cities. 
Limited mobility in a spatially distorted apartheid city has restricted the poor from participating 
in the economic, political and social life of the wider community and the city. Some of the stated 
objectives of the IRT system are to bring the key benefits to public transport users such as: 
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making transport more affordable; reducing travel times; providing longer operating hours; and 
accommodating the needs of special needs passengers.   
In this mini-thesis, I firstly identify major stakeholders in Cape Town’s MyCiTi bus; secondly, I  
provide details about these stakeholders, and thirdly, I look at the MyCiTi business model and 
rules of engagement that were applied between the City of Cape Town (hereinafter the COCT), 
the National Department of Transport services and all relevant stakeholders.  
In terms of research methods, the bulk of the work involved an understanding of city documents 
and doing key informant interviews. Key informant interviews were lengthy, semi-structured 
and face-to-face, which allowed for a free flow of ideas and in-depth information from persons 
intimately involved with the process. In seeking to understand the stakeholder views the 
researcher examined records of meetings, public statements, press statements and policy 
documents. I did desktop research on the model and changes in stakeholder’s views and tracked 
the possible gaps in their comprehension of the rules of engagement using documents such as 
minutes of meetings, public statements, press statements, policy documents. Local newspapers, 
which extensively covered participation and opposition to MyCiTi were surveyed.  
Aims 
 
The research questions for this mini thesis are:   
Who have been the major local stakeholders that have participated directly and indirectly 
in the urban transport debate since COCT?   
What were their interests and views?  
How have stakeholders’ views been modified, and  
How has the model evolved, what new issues have surfaced and what lessons might be 
learnt? 
The key stakeholders are: national and local government, taxi associations (also called the 
“paratransit” sector); private bus companies (subsidised by government) such as Golden Arrow; 
the public in the form of organised residential groups and civic associations, trade unions, 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (Prasa). Secondary stakeholders might be  vendors 
(involved in ticketing and related services); or various other private interests such as IT 
companies.  In identifying stakeholders for this study, I prioritised the city, bus companies, 
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formal taxi operators, and residents. From the literature review, I concluded that there is a 
paucity of scholarly work on how the MyCiTi bus system was navigated with stakeholders.   
 I drew on Bryson (1995: 27) for a comprehensive definition for the term stakeholder: “A 
stakeholder is defined as any person, group, or organisation that can place a claim on an 
organisation's attention, resources, or output or is affected by that output”. Stakeholder theory 
can be seen as an approach by which public decision-makers scan their environments in search 
of opportunities and threats. Stakeholders are the organised groups of people or interests which 
can be advantaged or negatively affected by change or action within the organisation. 
Stakeholders include those who are directly affected whereas secondary stakeholders are 
indirectly affected by an organisation's actions or policies. Stakeholder analysis requires 
defining key stakeholders, understanding where they stand, how flexible and open they are and 
developing cooperation between the stakeholders. The main objective is to ensure successful 
outcomes for the policy or project envisaged. If they are not likely to be positive, what will win 
them around to support a project? How will one manage their opposition?  Commonly used 
during the conception phase of a project for assessing the positions of stakeholders, stakeholder 
analysis is less frequently used in execution phase.  It also specifies mechanisms to influence 
other stakeholders.1 The stakeholder approach needs to be complemented with an understanding 
of the transaction and monitoring costs and insights from agent-principal theory.  Unfortunately, 
the current literature on MyCiti does not engage adequately with the fact that the model is based 
on a public-private partnership (PPP) which essentially involves a nexus of long  term contracts 
with various private entities. PPP’s are also defined as “arrangements where the public and 
private sectors both bring their complementary skills to a project, with varying levels of 
involvement and responsibility, for the purpose of providing public services or projects” (Tang, 
2009). Providing a critique of PPP’s Greve and Hodge (2010) cite several challenges pertinent 
in PPP’s namely long term and complex nature of the deals; their elitist and inaccessible nature 
(to ordinary citizens); lack of public participation and transparency, abdication of the lead role 
by government to private partners and thus enabling nation states to abdicate their 
responsibilities for the promotion and protection of their citizens’; government’s lack of capacity 
                                                 
1 
Http://www.institute.nhs.uk/quality_and_service_improvement_tools/quality_and_service_improvement_
tools/stakeholder_analysis.html#sthash.HP7DWJQL.dpuf 
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to manage and scrutinize the activities in the partnership leading to private partners 
manipulating the partnership for their own selfish ends.   
 
The VOC (or agent) is meant to act in the best interest of the City as custodian of the public 
interest (the principal). Agency problems arise when the service delivery agent who has better 
knowledge of the details of service delivery (asymmetrical information) and the principal are not 
aligned, and conflicts of interest arise. The cost of monitoring the agent (through elaborate 
service level agreements) cannot be estimated beforehand.  The agent is systemically likely to 
act in his/her own interests rather the principal’s. The risks attached to this process only become 
evident when it is too late because it may be too expensive for the principal to terminate the 
agent’s contract and it may also be a political embarrassment to the principal to expose to the 
voting public what has gone wrong. In summary the problem arises because service delivery is 
outsourced to an agent who has different priorities from the principal. Various mechanisms that 
may be useful to align the interests of the parties may be too complex or contested. This basic 
account of agency dilemmas has also occurred in the outsourcing debate at universities in South 
Africa. Outsourcing has generally been opposed by the labour movement as well as university 
managers in very recent times. In the case of MyCiTi, in 2006 the City of Cape Town decided 
not to adopt the full public model for the future transport system.  
Introduction to MyCiTi and key stakeholders 
A public bus service may be defined as a scheduled transport service, which is regulated but not 
necessarily owned by the city. Public systems are also more democratic and equitable. Enrique 
Peñalosa, the champion of the BRT system of Bogotá in Colombia, renowned for its thriving 
public transport system, noted that in the dedicated public bus lanes. “Thirty people on a bus can 
zoom past a Maserati with one person in, because thirty people should get thirty times the space 
as one person, no matter how much money they make. That’s true democracy.”2 
Cape Town since 2006 has been under the rule of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and its party 
leader, Helen Zille who has marketed the city as a pro-poor and investor friendly city. Cape 
Town (with a population of 3, 7 million, 2011) is exceptional in a number of ways given the 
spatial and socio-economic divisions, urban sprawl and rapid influx of new residents. It has 
                                                 
2 Cited in http://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-voices/cape-towns-myciti-brt-four-years-into-its-democracy. 
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enticed much scholarly and political attention in the last few years. Parnell and Pieterse (1999) 
refer to Cape Town’s “flawed beauty” marked by extreme, enduring and concentrated poverty. 
Samara (2011) shows that institutional exclusion and gang-related violence in Cape Town’s 
working class townships such as Khayelitsha, Delft, Manenberg and Mitchells Plain are a 
common phenomenon. Such residential areas live in constant uncertainty and anxiety about 
criminality and continuous theft of public transport infrastructure has meant countless delays. 
Besteman’s book (2008) has explored the feelings and experiences of local residents -- racial 
fear, mistrust, and resentment that have accompanied the stalled promise of upliftment after the 
end of apartheid. Samara (2011) points out that statistically black South Africans especially in 
the townships rather than white South Africans who use private cars are more likely to be the 
victims of crime. As a result, the use of private cars has increased.  Many scholars agree that, 
Cape Town is a spatially divided city with poor areas mainly the Cape Flats being 
underdeveloped and the key centres of economic power and growth remain in the former white 
areas (Turok, 2010; Samara, 2011).  
In Cape Town, scheduled services in the Cape Town metropolitan area were earlier provided by 
two bus companies namely Golden Arrow Bus Services (Pty) (GABS) and Sibanye Bus 
Services. Both bus companies received a subsidy provided in terms of an interim contract with 
the Western Cape provincial government. Unscheduled services are provided by mini-bus taxis 
throughout the City; however legislation requires that all operators need to be members of an 
association that is registered with the Provincial Transport Registrar or a non-member who is 
registered with the Registrar. According to COCT, many old and new stakeholder groups will 
contribute to MyCiTi -- an envisaged externally provided bus service regulated by the City 
(CoCT 2013).  
Below I have sketched a few key stakeholders and some of their issues (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Typical stakeholder spectrum in Cape Town urban transport 
Name Main Concerns 
City of Cape Town 
  
 
The main focus of the City of Cape Town was to develop an 
integrated public transport system that could serve the public 
well but also leverage private sector expertise. T h i s  w a s  
b e l i e v e d  t o  b e  p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  t h e  
implementation o f  an Integrated Rapid Transit system, 
with a s y s t e m a t i c  r o l l o u t  timeframe of 15 to 20 
years. The introduction of a public transport network, with 
high-quality rail and road services, would place at least 75% 
of Cape Town’s population within 500 metres of the transport 
provision system. The city sets the rules for the system and 
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where the system is to be rolled out. 
 
PRASA (Railways network) 
 
To support mass transport of workers using rail services,  
an e ffect ive support  road network necess i tated  
other forms of feeder services. 
 
 
Taxi associations 
 
The first minibus-taxi association, the South African Black 
Taxi Association (SABTA) formed in 1979 in order to assist 
operators in obtaining permits from the DoT. Together with 
the South African Long Distance Taxi Association 
(SALDTA), SABTA began pressing government to 
deregulate the industry. In 1988, the Transport Deregulation 
Act effectively legalised minibus-taxi operations, giving rise 
to a great influx of new minibuses into the industry in a short 
amount of time. 
Taxi operators began to form associations at local levels. The 
main objective of the local associations was to intervene on 
behalf of their members to regulate loading practices and 
fares. However, while association leaders ostensibly worked 
in the best interests of their members, more often than not, 
they catered to their own interests above all else. In addition, 
sometimes their interests were in direct conflict with those of 
their members. 
 
Golden Arrow 
 
The initial arrangement was that the bus services be operated 
by Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS) under an interim 
contract with the Western Cape Provincial Government. At 
the time, GABS operated 1021 buses during peak hours while 
serving 900 routes in the Cape Metropolitan Area. They were 
also funded with an amount of R660 million. Later, a part of 
the City of Cape Town’s IRT service – known as MyCiTi – 
started its operation between Tableview on the West Coast to 
the Civic Centre (CBD). 
 
Taxi owners 
 
Taxi owners and their drivers were (amongst other) concerned 
about their prospective earnings, the loss of revenue as their 
taxi vehicles had to be removed from routes, the potential job 
losses, the complexities associated with becoming ‘formal’ 
business owners or Vehicle Operating Companies (VOC) of 
the MyCiTi. This led to protracted negotiations and many 
bitter meetings.   
Cosatu Cosatu has been a persistent critic of the IRT. Tony 
Ehrenreich has suggested that the IRT “bus service were 
unfairly rolled out in former white areas first, disadvantaging 
the black communities again. Ironically, the service went to 
the areas where most people use private transport instead of 
the Cape Flat areas where most people desperately need the 
public transport. This is the clearest indication of how the DA 
maintains the apartheid generational advantages for the white 
communities”. 
 
National Government 
 
National Government funds the capital costs and it was 
National Government in 2006 that realised the problems that 
the cities have with public transport.   
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The City of Cape Town is the main stakeholder for the implementation of the MyCiTi system 
The national government provides for all start up and capital costs (buses, compensation to taxi-
industry, stations, and new road works automation systems). Phase 1 of the system was 
introduced in May 2010, prior the 2010 soccer World Cup from Cape Town airport to the inner 
city. It was further envisaged that Phase 1 of the IRT provides bus services in especially high-
density areas without railways.  It is important to note that the MyCiTi is based on a model 
where the City and private sector are in a partnership in a semi-privatised system (COCT, 
2012b: xi).  
 
Figure 1: Phases of MyCiti Rollout 
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Following on a Section 78 (1) report to City of Cape Town in March 2008, the Council rejected 
a proposal by organised labour for an internal mechanism i.e. a fully public model and resolved 
that the provision of these services should be by way of an external mechanism (a partnership 
with the private sector).  A city run restructured public transport service was estimated to cost 
R5, 3b per annum. It was noted by the City that “the overall trend for the provision of such 
services (actual operations) is that it is undertaken by private companies” (Holtzhausen and 
Abrahamson, 2011: 141). 
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The initial stakeholder engagements lasted for a period of just over three years (2007-2009) 
before phase 1 with the city (using private consultants) engaging 14 local taxi associations (Key 
Informant Interview 1, 7 May 2014). The process of creating a business model for the existing 
industry in the IRT system has been evolving since the project’s inception (COCT 2008).   
Changes to the initial strategy have occurred for several reasons:  
changes in project leadership; adjustments to the financial model; approvals 
and disapprovals at the City Council or political level; a project team that has 
been learning the process on-the-run; engagement and initial negotiations with 
the existing taxi and bus industry; and, finally, issuing of national guidelines 
and negotiations with the minibus-taxi industry in other cities (COCT, 2010c). 
In order to get to grips with the issues, I include a time line of key developments. 
Time Line of Key Developments up to 2010 
  
2007-8 Project office started to plan IRT; representatives from CoCT and minibus taxi 
industry go on study tours to Bogota.  
August 2008 – Council approves commencement of project to implement Phase 1A of 
the IRT 
October 2008 – Public information meeting disrupted by representatives from the 
minibus taxi industry 
February 2009 - Draft Prospectus released by COCT to guide negotiations with the 
minibus taxi industry 
NLTA 2009 passed providing for devolution of responsibility for public transport to 
municipal government 
September 2009 - Cost of MyCiTi made known 
October 2009 - Council realises that costs will be much higher than anticipated, but 
grants permission for MyCiTi to proceed, limited to what is available through National 
funding 
April 2010 – An additional R3.42 billion grants allocated by national government to 
COCT 
May 2010 - World Cup MyCiTi service begins operating based on interim contracts with 
previous taxi operators to run service 
2012 - updated Business Plan released 
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October 2013 - Long term contracts (12 years) signed with three Vehicles Operators 
Contracts  
(Source: adapted from Boulle and Van Ryneveld, 2015) 
It is also vital to note that the urban built form of Cape Town is a major problem because the 
most dense areas (Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha) where the majority of the City workforce 
lives is on the periphery and low density areas (mainly white are close to the city).  Long travels 
distances at peak times and high inequality create a structural problem for any high quality 
transport system making it very expensive. Travel from major working class areas is generally 
time consuming, dangerous, overcrowded and unreliable (COCT, 2012).  For the minibus taxi 
and workers, it was meant to improve conditions of service and opportunities to learn new skills. 
The “public” are not defined as “stakeholders”, yet a number of consultations have been held 
with concerned residents in particular localities.  
MyCiTi was conceived in four phases of expansion from 2010-2030 with a network expanding 
outwards from the CBD.  By early 2015, the roll out of Phase One was nearly complete. It 
moved about 54 000 passengers every weekday, with a fleet of 214 vehicles and over 402 
drivers. The Phase One of the service included a 26 km trunk route going northwards from the 
Waterfront to the City Centre.  Included since 2014, were 28 routes (Hout Bay, south west of the 
city centre, to Atlantis to the north of the city). An airport service and an express route (referred 
to as the N2 Express) run to the southeast (Cape Flats) to Mitchell’s Plain and Khayelitsha. 
Trunks under construction in mid-2015 linked Montague Gardens (an industrial area) and 
Century City (a large commercial and residential area) to the system (COCT, 2015).  
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The City of Cape Town unveiled phase two of MyCiTi in 2014 aimed mostly at commuters in 
Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Philippi and Hanover Park. 
(http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/11/19/MyCiTi-to-take-more-for-a-ride). The Codeta 
taxi association in Khayelitsha and the Route Six Taxi Association in Mitchells Plain together 
with the Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS) make up the vehicle operating company (VOC) 
that operates the N2 Express service which was rolled out on 5 July 2014. “This service was the 
first to be launched in the metro south-east and provides the residents from Mitchells Plain and 
Khayelitsha with safe, decent and affordable transport to the Civic Centre station in Cape Town” 
(CoCT Press statement 2015). The N2 Express Route to Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain had 
been delayed due to disagreements between the city and taxi operators. A typical domestic 
worker passenger from Khayelitsha might pay R184 a month to travel by train from her home in 
Khayelitsha to Cape Town’s central station. There she catches the MyCiTi bus to Camps Bay 
for an additional R345 a month. (16 October 2013, Cape Argus). 
 
According to Mayoral committee member for transport Brett Herron “phase two had two new 
routes, which would cover 35 communities. This means the bus service - previously criticised 
for mainly servicing only the well-off parts of Cape Town - will ferry working class 
communities. Construction of the R4.1-billion project will start in mid-2015 in Philippi and 
Strandfontein Road  in Ottery. The first trip is expected in 2020. The two routes are expected to 
serve an area with a population of 1.4million residents”. Unlike other routes in DuNoon and 
Table View, taxi operators in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain would not have to scrap their taxis 
and surrender their operating licences, as MyCiTi would only be a top-up service to these areas 
with huge transport capacity constraints. (zara.nicholson@inl.co.za 03 June 2015).    
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Figure 3 Phase Two (N2 Express) 
 
In July 2014, the City of Cape Town launched the MyCiTi N2 Express service to Mitchells 
Plain and Khayelitsha. More than 644 000 passengers have made use of the service since its 
inception. Mayor Patricia de Lille opened the newly constructed station and supporting 
infrastructure at the Mitchell’s Plain public transport interchange, which represents a R18, 5 
million investment for commuters in these communities. “Construction started in January 2014 
and was completed in May, with the additional work to be completed by August. Six buses 
operate during peak hours along the N2 Express route for Mitchells Plain and 10 buses operate 
during peak hour for the Khayelitsha route. Buses are added to the route when the demand 
arises. When all buses for the N2 Express are operational, there will be a total of 40 buses 
allocated to the route” (City of Cape Town Media statement, July 2014). 
Finally, I stress that the MyCiTi has six main parts each overseen or run by separate municipal 
entities and private companies. The operations unit (lodged in the City), the vehicle operations 
(lodged with three private companies); automated fare collection (outsourced by the city); a 
control centre (outsourced) station management (outsourced) and finally an advertising 
contractor (private media company). By late 2015 the City noted that “the MyCiTi service 
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consists of 31 routes with buses covering on average a distance of over 1 270 000 kilometres 
each month; more than 480 bus drivers; 222 buses in the peak-hour periods, transporting 59 184 
passengers on a week day” (Transport for Cape Town, 7 October 2015).  
The thesis is organised thematically according to various stakeholders. Chapters are set up as 
follows: Chapter one provides an introduction; chapter two sets out the national context and 
historical background and also provides a literature review; chapter three speaks to the specifics 
of Cape Town’s social and transport geography and key issues for the City and community as 
stakeholders. Chapter four introduces the Golden arrow component of MyCiTi and the final and 
possibly most fundamental player namely the mini-bus taxi industry (now vehicle operator 
companies) is discussed alongside a detailed description of the workings and problems of the 
MyCiTi business plan. The final chapter wraps up the findings of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2:  Historical and legislative background to transport and a            
literature review  
This chapter provides detailed historical background to recent transport legal framework and 
debates in SA as well as basic socio-geographical data. It then provides a critical review of 
literature and theory relevant to the study.  Some of the early works include Dugard (1996, 
2001), Khosa (1994), McCaul (1990) and Pirie (1992b), which all provide historical contexts for 
the emergency of the mode, and its relationships with other modes and government. More recent 
work by Schalekamp and Behrens (2013) and Venter (2011) review the failed attempts by 
government to successfully engage with the taxi industry in its formalisation attempts. .   
Nevertheless, literature on the South African taxi industry is sparse, specifically concerning its 
detailed operations. 
Most of the literature available is focused on the history of one key stakeholder, the minibus taxi 
industry, taxi violence and the taxi recapitalisation program.  Among the more useful is 
Maungnidze (2011) who focussed on the typical transport problems of poor populations in 
developing world cities and the consequences for the livelihood the urban poor. Her research 
established that the poor are likely to be worse-off than the other income groups in terms of all 
the service levels.   A recent paper on engaging stakeholders deals specifically with only the 
taxis industry (Schalekamp and Behrens, 2013). This paper provides a useful overview of the 
history and complications of the City of Cape Town engagement with the taxi associations.  The 
most recent account of MyCiti however has been written by Boulle and Van Ryneveldt (2015). 
Based on interviews and insider knowledge their paper presents an “heroic” account, arguing 
that the key reasons for the successes so far has been an incremental approach and the role of  
experienced facilitators appointed by the City. Their main achievement in Phase One was to 
build trust with the taxi-industry. According to these authors, the turning points were the 2010 
World Cup and the signing of the 12-year contracts with the vehicles operator companies in 
2013.   
The key challenge of the engagement was to overcome the deep levels of 
mistrust historically present in the relationship between the City and the taxi 
industry … taking almost five years between initial engagements and final 
signing of long-term vehicle operating contracts. Out of necessity an 
incremental approach was adopted and this was able to achieve a degree of 
progress, despite sustained opposition (Boulle and Van Ryneveldt, 2015: 22) 
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Historical background to transport 
Transport can be seen as integral to productive and inclusive cities and social space and urban 
planning. Under the apartheid regime, the state’s policies forcibly relocated black people 
(“black” here includes Coloured, Indian and African) into places of residence often at huge 
distances from their workplaces. As part of apartheid’s orderly urbanisation, in Cape Town 
black people were forced to the fringes of the urban areas such as Mitchells Plain and Atlantis.  
The provision of elementary transport thus was crucial to the functions of segregated dormitory 
townships and moving large armies of workers to workplaces.  However, in the mid-1980s the 
apartheid state found it increasing burdensome to continue paying huge subsidies for urban bus 
companies and it also allowed rail transport to degenerate (McCaul, 1987; Walters, 2013).  
Historically, passenger transport under white minority rule before 1994 was also a crucial site of 
contestation and popular protest.  As noted by Khosa (1995: 167): “The South African passenger 
transportation system was by and large designed for daily transportation of labor to and from the 
workplace”.  This often involved transporting Africans from the fringes of urban centers into the 
cities, based on the racially segregated nature of minority rule.  Furthermore, “in time, transport 
became a site of popular struggles and a dramatic expression of tensions and disputes over 
control, management and affordability of racially divided spaces” (Khosa,1995: 168).   
Donaldson (2006: 344) explains that:  
One of the greatest spatial challenges to overcome in the post-apartheid city is 
the inequality and spatial inefficiency caused by apartheid planning.  Not 
surprisingly a World Bank report of the early 1990s considered South Africa’s 
cities among the most inefficient in the world.  Cities were (are) characterized 
by low-density sprawl, fragmentation and separation, all of these contributing 
to the dysfunctional structure where privilege was racially determined.  Over a 
period of four decades, black South Africans were systematically marginalized, 
among others, in terms of accommodation, leisure, employment, and transport.  
Structural deficiencies in the former apartheid city, resulting from segregation 
and low-density sprawl, created long-distance work-travel patterns.  
The growing impetus in favour of deregulation of the public transport industry eventually led to 
the Welgemoed Commission of Inquiry in 1981.  The bodies that were in favour of this inquiry 
and move to privatise included the Taxi Owner’s Association, the Free Market Foundation and 
the Transport Consultation Commission.  In tracing the transport policy development we noted 
that in 1986, a White Paper on National Transport Policy was adopted by the apartheid 
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government which legalised the entry of the 16-seat minibus taxi industry (Naude 1999: 169). 
The Transport Deregulation Act of 1988 (RSA 1988) effectively legalised the 16-seater minibus 
taxi and gave birth to the taxi industry. 
Many bus operators lost a major share of their businesses through the intense competition of an 
unregulated minibus taxi industry. The bus sector was concerned over the fact that the taxi 
industry was eroding their monopoly status (McCaul, 1987). The growth in the taxi industry 
eventually resulted in a significant increase in the levels of subsidy on a per bus passenger basis 
as operators faced huge overhead costs (fleets, infrastructure ) that had to be covered by the 
revenue from a diminished passenger base.  
The 1986 White Paper further stipulated that bus services also had to be put out to competitive 
tender (DoT, 1986). In 1987, the first bus services were therefore put out to tender as 
demonstration projects to evaluate the effect of tendering on the public transport environment 
(Naude, 1999). The first operators’ services that were put out to tender were those who gave 
notice to the DoT that they could no longer maintain services mainly because of insufficient 
funding, and that they intended to suspend their services (Naude, 1999).  
In 1979, the South African Black Taxi Association (SABTA) was established comprising 
dozens of taxi owners associations (Dugard, 2001). The main reason for its establishment at the 
time was to obtain permits from the department allowing the members of the association to carry 
not just four, but eight passengers. When permits were no longer an issue, the industry was soon 
flooded with drivers and there was tight competition for routes and passengers  (Matjila, 2001). 
SABTA, however felt that the deregulation of the taxi industry would cause chaos and fragment 
the industry.  SABTA fears proved to be right, the taxi industry soon was characterised by 
exploitation, violence and aggressive competition between operators attempting to poach 
passengers and hound the same routes and this was caused by low barriers to entry for new taxi 
operators thus turning competition into fierce competition (Bubesi, 2000). The Human Rights 
Committee (1998) observed outbreaks of violent taxi wars around Johannesburg, Soweto, the 
East Rand and Pretoria in Gauteng, around Durban in KwaZulu-Natal, in the Eastern Cape 
around Bisho and King Williams Town and Umtata, and in Limpopo, Western Cape and the 
North West Province. The taxi operators formed local groups and banded together to form 
particularistic taxi associations.  However, these associations used their organisational strength 
to extract income by means of violence and the state officials did nothing to stop this 
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intimidation. Dugard (2001) suggested that the violence would decrease but instead the taxi 
violence escalated.   
After the elections in 1994, the number of taxi associations especially the mother bodies 
increased yet again. Mother bodies comprise of loose alliances of local and long-distance taxi 
associations that operate in a particular region and province. The national associations and the 
mother bodies wanted to protect the interests of the local taxi associations affiliated to them. 
Most of the taxi violence could thus be traced to the executive officers of the various mother 
bodies (Dugard, 2001).  The senior executives of these associations decided who can use what 
route and what taxi rank and how much privilege will cost them. The mother bodies were 
characterised by the use of violence in attempts to protect their spheres of interest and these kind 
of violence escalated after the emergence of the South African Long Distance Taxi Association 
(SALDTA) as a supra-local umbrella taxi association and this association was a direct 
competitor to SABTA’s leadership of the taxi industry.  According to Dugard (2001): 
The sudden permit free for-all, set against a backdrop of the escalating 
community violence during apartheid’s final years, established the scene for the 
sectarian taxi wars that have plagued the industry. 
Evolution of Post-Apartheid Policy  
Five important legislative documents in the field of transport emerged since the ANC 
government came into power in 1994. The first was the RDP 1994, then  a White Paper (RSA, 
1996), followed by Moving Ahead (1999) and then the  National Land Transport Transition Act 
(RSA 2000). The vision statement was to  
Provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully integrated transport 
operations and infrastructure which will best meet the needs of freight and 
passenger customers at improving levels of service and cost in a fashion which 
supports government strategies for economic and social development whilst 
being environmentally and economically sustainable (RSA, 1996). 
The objectives of transport policies have shifted since the White Paper on National Transport 
Policy of 1996.  The general theme of the above-mentioned policies was to give impetus to the 
public transport and non-motorised transport and furthermore to prioritise and promoting a 
modal shift towards having fewer private cars on the road. Easing congestion and having a more 
extensive public transport system through the provision of convenient and efficient road and rail 
transport system emerged as strong policy directive.  One of the related goals was to provide 
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affordable transport  and more equitable access to the city. It has been envisaged that this could 
be achieved through integration of modes. 
The NLTTA (National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000) aimed to regulate and transform 
the minibus sector and ensure a sustainable and effective subsidy allocation.  Section 21 of the 
Act states that there should be a National Land Transport Framework (NLTSF). It is the duty of 
the Minister to ensure that this framework is drafted every five years.  The core function of the 
NLTSF is to guide land transport planning countrywide. The MEC is responsible for ensuring 
that the approved policies at National Level are implemented and also promote the 
implementation of these policies within spheres of other government bodies.  The MEC must 
co-ordinate transport planning and ensure adequate provision of infrastructure and public 
transport services.  After consultation with the local governments, the Province must be sub-
divided into transport areas in the form of “declared metropolitan or services council 
administrative area.” 
The NLTTA and the Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 1998) require that transport and land-use be 
integrated and this is intended to be achieved through Integrated Development Plans (IDP) and 
Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs). The NDoT, through its relationship with provincial and local 
authorities, is responsible for the long-term planning of transport systems in South Africa, thus 
the needs to develop practices that are aimed increasing the access to appropriate and quality 
public transport.   
The new structure of the public transport in South Africa sees the public passenger transport 
system be based on “regulated competition” and a mix of public and private sectors.  The 
regulation will take the form of a permission, (authority to operate a route or network with no 
subsidy) contract (the authority to operate a route at a tendered contract price) or concession 
(authority to operate a rail line or network at an agreed price). This is awarded in terms of a 
passenger transport plan and is subjected to strict law enforcement.  This arguably, can be seen 
as a form of partial and staged privatisation.  
Restructuring  the Taxi Industry 
In an attempt to address the problems of the taxi industry, the post-apartheid government 
established the National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) to establish the causes of and solutions to the 
violence that raged in the taxi industry.  The NTTT held its first meeting on 20 April 1995 and 
comprised a chairperson from the National Department of Transport (NDOT), nine government 
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officials from provincial departments of transport, ten taxi industry representatives and nine 
special advisors.  The NTTT held 36 public hearings around the country between August and 
December 1995.  In 1996, the NTTT released its first report to the Minister of Transport and the 
report recommended the re-regulation of the taxi industry.   
Since then the main aim has been to recapitalise the taxi industry from scratch, phasing out the 
16-seater minibus taxis in favour of new 18 and 35 seaters vehicles. Government planned to 
subsidise owners to help them buy the new vehicles.  The process also aimed to introduce smart 
card technology thus eliminating cash from commuter transactions.  The process has been on-
going but remains unfulfilled. In conclusion, it can be seen that by the late 1990s the 
government was faced an inherited fragmented urban transport system. Many taxi associations 
especially the mother-bodies opposed government’s attempts to re-regulate the industry and thus 
there was an escalation in taxi related violence. The government had to change its focus because 
it was clear that the re-regulation and re-capitalisation plans were not working as planned.  
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Chapter 3: City of Cape Town, MyCiTi and the larger community 
(Stakeholders 1 and 2)  
In this chapter I look specifically at the city administration’s plans in the Integrated 
Development Plans (IDP) and their transport strategies as the key stakeholder. I provide a brief 
sketch of Cape Town’s divided socio-geography. Then I provide an indication of selected 
community responses. 
The Rea Vaya BRT system in Johannesburg, along with MyCiTi in Cape Town became major 
policy interventions to reconstruct the post-apartheid landscape. The City of Cape Town’s 
Public Transport Plan’s (2006), vision for public transport is “a safe, effective, efficient, 
equitable and affordable public transport system that supports sustainable, social and economic 
development in an environmentally responsible manner.”   In June 2007 the City of Cape Town 
and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape approved the original Integrated Transport 
Plan dated (2006 – 2011). In alignment with this vision, the City decided to investigate the 
implementation of an Integrated Rapid Transit System for Cape Town, based on the concept and 
principles of a Bus Rapid Transit System.  
The BRT system, as noted before, drew on lessons from densely populated cities especially 
South America countries. Thus, in early 2008 South American consultants, that included 
international experts with experience in delivering BRT systems, were contracted to develop the 
operational and business plans for the Cape Town system. Eichhorn (2013:1) noted that the 
MyCiTi project was “initially designed on the highly successful Bogota model” which lends 
itself to high population density linking working routes with high volumes of commuting.   
In Gauteng province, unlike the Gautrain, the Rea Vaya links residents of Soweto to the core of 
Johannesburg, and does a better job of connecting people from historically segregated areas to 
their places of work. This is a progressive step in terms of battling mobility-related exclusion for 
citizens who can access the stations.  In addition, it is much less expensive to build than rapid 
rail transit (Thomas, 2011).   
One of the central challenges, as already noted, for the BRT system has been integrating and 
incorporating the minibus taxis.  The Rea Vaya, for example, runs parallel to many of the 
previous taxi routes.  As noted by Walters (2013), taxi owners and their drivers were (amongst 
other) concerned about their future earnings, the loss of revenue as their taxi vehicles had to be 
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removed from the route, the potential job losses, the complexities associated with a ‘formal’ 
business, etc.  This led to protracted negotiations and many acrimonious meetings.   
The Cape Town model required that taxi-owners would cease operations (forgo licences and 
scrap vehicles) and be compensated for this. They could then take the cash or buy shares in 
organised formations/associations were to form companies” which would co-own the MyCiTi 
through 12-year contracts. This transition for the taxi industry needs to be negotiated over a long 
period, and poses a substantial challenge for municipalities to proceed with the BRT 
implementation.  Often each new section required another set of negotiations with the taxi 
industry (Walters, 2013).   
Cape Town context and divided views  
Cape Town is often portrayed as a “deeply divided city” possibly “one of the most unequal and 
segregated and as a city hostile to Black Africans and among the “most racist” (Samara, 2011; 
McDonald, 2008). The majority black population (African, Coloured and Indian) live on the 
flood plain (also called the Cape Flats in the South-East extending 30km from the CBD) in 
dormitory townships that supply labour to the city and wealthy residents. Blacks live in dense 
peripheral townships on the Cape Flats with many informal settlements. Density has increased 
with thousands of backyard shacks.  
In 2011, Cape Town had a population of 3, 7 million of whom 585 800 were White (about 15% 
of the total in CT compared to national proportion of 8.9%). The white population in CT is 
distinctively richer and older with 15, 3% older than 64 compared to Cape Town’s African 
population with only 2,1% older than 64 (Statistics South Africa Census, 2011).  Almost every 
second white adult (45%) had higher education (higher than grade 12) compared to one in ten 
blacks (Africans and coloureds). There are few poor whites in Cape Town. Only 0, 3% of whites 
lived in informal dwellings compared to 43% of Africans and 7% of coloureds (all data from 
2011 census). In 2011, a mere 14000 whites were unemployed compared to 383 000 blacks. 
Almost 35 % of White households earned above R12 800 per month compared to 2% of African 
households in 2001. In 2011, these figures had changed: whites improved to 39%. At the lower 
income levels, more than half of African people in Cape Town earned less than R3 200 pm 
compared to 7% of white people.  
Maps created from the data gathered during Census 2011 show that in the 10 years since the 
previous census, most of the dynamics between race and space have barely changed, except for 
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a few areas such as Woodstock, Rondebosch East and Pinelands. Khayelitsha, established in 
1983 under apartheid specifically for an African population, is Cape Town’s biggest black 
township. In 2009-2010, it became a centre of a “toilet wars” – a rebellion around quality of 
services and lack of dignity accorded the residents. Located on the sand dunes of the False Bay 
coast, it is approximately 30km from Cape Town’s central business district, which makes 
commuting costs high for its residents.  
The distance between the black areas and the city’s economic hub deepens social exclusion. 
Some 40 per cent of main breadwinners in Cape Town’s poor areas take more than an hour to 
reach their workplace. The most common means of transport to work is by train (42 %); 
followed by taxi (17%) and bus (15%, and a return journey to work costs more than R 20 per 
trip for 60 per cent of breadwinners (de Swardt, 2005). The City researchers say, “at least two-
thirds of homes in Nyanga and Khayelitsha were found to be susceptible to flood damage, and 
most shelters were at risk of fire and wind damage” (de Swardt et al, 2005). The bulk of Cape 
Town’s 195 listed informal settlements are clustered along the N2 highway and comprised an 
estimated 100 000 informal structures in 2005 (City of Cape Town, 2006). The figure has 
increased so that by 2008 as much as 20 percent of the City population resided in an estimated 
118000 shacks. This figure excludes backyard shacks which number 85000 (Small, City of Cape 
Town, 2008). According to a sample survey conducted by the municipalities housing 
directorate, about 41 000 families live in the backyards of the City’s rental properties alone. The 
survey found that the average backyard household consists of four members and that over 90% 
have a monthly household income of R3 000 and less.  Geographers note that: “There was a 
striking absence of formal economic activity in the South East district (the Cape Flats). This 
district accommodates at least a third of the city’s total population (City of Cape Town, 2010b), 
yet total turnover and payroll in 2005 amounted to only 0.5% and 0.3% of the city totals 
respectively (Sinclair and Turok, 2012: 404). 
Of those employed in Cape Town, 22% work in the precarious informal sector while 40%  are 
employed in small or medium enterprises (IDP, 2006). With earnings generally low in these 
sectors, it was estimated by the City that 33 percent of Cape Town households earned below 
R1600 (COCT, 2004d) and using the state’s terms were “indigent”. “Income inequality has a 
racial dimension in Cape Town”. 
https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/ehd/Documents/EHDEcon.pdf. About 22% live in an informal 
dwelling/shack. Andrew Boraine, in his capacity as Chairman of the SA Cities Network, said 
that Cape Town had failed to create job opportunities in line with its economic growth. He cited 
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poor transport systems in the city as major constraints. “Urbanisation continues at a faster rate 
here than in any other province, as poor rural dwellers, particularly from the Eastern Cape, move 
here in search of economic opportunities” (Zille, 2009).  
The African National Congress (ANC) became a minority party in 2000 when it lost elections. It 
still commands mass support in Xhosa speaking black areas. “The African National Congress 
(ANC) in the Western Cape will continue lobbying the national government to withhold funding 
for Cape Town’s multimillion-rand MyCiTi bus expansion until the party’s call for "genuine" 
consultation with affected communities has been met” (Business Day, 2015 May 24). 
Post-1994 transport in Cape Town  
Cape Town, as a City document highlights (TCT 2013) “is an inefficient city ... the majority of 
the poor living in remote areas with no economic base; low densities; tidal morning and 
afternoon peaks and one way flows of people. This results in a very expensive public transport 
service that is a burden to the City. An over reliance on the private car as public transport cannot 
serve the growing needs; and (there are) different standards in the public transport system”. 
Because much of apartheid layout of the city involve with dormitory townships, the bulk of 
transportation is one way in the morning and the other way in the afternoon/evening. A bus from 
Mitchells Plain would be full on the outbound trip and empty on the return trip. “Single 
direction, point to point trips”, high income inequality and dispersed urban form were seen as 
major structural problems (COCT, 2012b: 10). 
The transport system in Cape Town is very uneven with massive overcrowding on the rail 
system from south eastern areas: Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain. “Commuters travel a 
roundabout way to reach their final destination … towards Bellville and Claremont” (CoCT 
2012b: 22).  Workers spend up to 20% of their income on public transport (Walters, 2013). The 
train service frequently breaks down for various reasons sometimes related to copper cable theft. 
There are also major safety concerns on trains. At rush hour, the trains are jam-packed it is often 
not possible to board them.    
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Table 3.1: Modes of transport by race in CT 
,  
SOURCE: IDP Cape Town 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/IDP/Documents/COCT_IDP_prf82013.pdf 
As Table 3.1 shows above is that 2.36% of blacks use trains; 20.71% use taxis; 75.20% of 
whites use private cars whereas only 19.74% of Africans do. Not even 1% of whites use taxis, 
and buses.  In other words, they occupy a different circuit of movement, more convenient but 
ecologically and socially irrational. They can also avoid contact with perceived danger and by 
default black people.  This transport apartheid or renewed apartheid ‘developed over decades 
and is difficult to shift” according to the City (COCT, 2012: 11). However, the private car 
culture is actively encouraged by the city by making car mobility easy and cheap through low 
parking fees, extensive highways. It is replicated in social life in malls, private schools, private 
hospitals and so on all linked to private cars. 
The City of Cape Town’s transport plan aims is to give priority to public transport, thus focusing 
on public transport infrastructure and services in development corridors.  The plan also aims to 
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restructure the minibus-taxi industry and incorporate it into a unified formalised public transport 
sector. The City of Cape Town’s Integrate Development Plan has identified access and mobility 
as one the strategic themes for development and this is  in turn based on the “Mobility Strategy”. 
The COCT seeks to “Transform and restructure public transport within the City of Cape Town 
to provide a high quality public transport system. Encourage the use of public transport and non-
motorised transport over the use of the private car. Distribution within residential areas to 
activities such as schools, hospitals, shopping centres, recreational areas, institutional 
complexes” (Williams, 2002).  
Joint funding for the improvement of transportation infrastructure by all three spheres of 
government contributed significantly to the idea of renewed public transportation and road 
works. The 2010 World Cup transportation projects, for example, were funded through the 
Public Transport Infrastructure and System Grant, with an allocation of R11,7 billion. National 
Government used the 2010 Soccer World Cup to accelerate transport service provision in South 
Africa’s through significant investments into world class transportation infrastructure.  
Key issues for the COCT    
The City of Cape Town’s detailed transport plans of  2006, did not only look at transporting fans 
during the 2010 soccer World Cup events, but more importantly putting infrastructure in place 
that would have a lasting benefits for the city’s public transport. Those who visited Cape Town 
during the 2010 FIFA World Cup had access to a transportation system linked to their 
accommodation areas, including the World Cup facilities and the city’s main tourist’s 
attractions. Sadly, the airport service remained underused with 10 passengers per trip on a good 
day (West Cape News, 2010). According to data from a key informant in the City (Interview 1b, 
2015) in the three months August to October only 113 monthly tickets (at R780 each) were sold 
(about 37 per month). Only 5520 single tickets (one way) were sold over the same three months. 
For a service that operates for 18 hours a day with large busses departing every 20 minutes 
(more 80 one way trips) it is clear that buses are only transporting about 61 persons a day. 
See table 4 below 
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 Table 4: Three Months passenger ticket Data 2015 
 Monthly Premium @ R780 Single Premium @ R85 
 Passengers Amount Income Passengers Amount Income 
Sep- 39 R 780 R 30,420 1704 R 85.00 R 144,840. 
Oct- 34 R 780 R 26,520 1656 R 85.00 R 140,760. 
Nov- 40 R 780 R 31,200 2160 R 85.00 R 183,600. 
Total  113  R 88,140. 5520  R 469,200. 
 
As part of the City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP), apart from building the 
Cape Town stadium, one of the other major areas for 2010 investments was public transport. In 
October 2013, twelve year contracts with three companies (called vehicle operator companies) 
were signed to provide on-going vehicle operations for the first of four envisaged phases 
MyCiTi within Cape Town’s public transport system.  
We might note at this stage that MyCiTi is a “mega-project”  and like other mega projects such 
as the Gautrain where cost spiraled from R7 billion to R30 billion are linked to the prestige of 
the government in power, and the mission to leave a legacy and set a standard. Van der 
Westhuizen (2007: 334) argues that:  
political symbolism appears to override utilitarian or rational considerations 
and within that context, the Gautrain as a mega-project needs to be understood 
as signaling South Africa’s pre-eminence as the modern African state.  In other 
words, the Gautrain symbolically buttresses the country’s quest to punch above 
its weight in international affairs.    
A key cost issue is the profitability and viability of the system which will be severely affected if 
the other road-based public transport services (mini-taxis) continue operations on nearby routes. 
The City of Cape Town therefore asserted that such competing routes must be required to cease 
operations. However, it also recognised a rare opportunity to formalise the existing industry by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
allowing them to form companies and operate the new IRT system. The “major  premise is that 
the IRT would replace all existing modes of public transport (scheduled and on-demand)” 
(Whitehead, 2014).  Another issue might be the overselling of the IRT, under-utilisation of 
busses, and contentious issues such as community protests and strikes.  
A further concern is the failure to cover operating costs and the current and future burden on the 
city’s finances. Originally, the City said it would contribute to shortfalls in MyCiTi revenue but 
would also place a cap of four percent of its rates income to such assistance.  (This amount was 
close to R190 million in 2011, see COCT 2012b: x).  
The larger community responses since 2010 
Public views on MyCiTi are fragmented across different communities and across time because 
different people are affected depending on when the rollout occurs. Much opposition and also 
support has been expressed. Whilst the City produces a positive spin, newspapers seem to be 
less generous.  
A recurring issue is the class bias of the IRT (see Cosatu statements) and the perception that the 
rich benefit more. 
I think better research and consideration could have been done. They started the 
phase in the affluent and rich community who can afford to travel with their 
own cars. The majority of the people come from your poor townships that are 
unsafe and can be dismissed easily if you arrive late at work more than once. I 
know they are trying to reduce the amount of cars on the road, but I think 
affordability and safety should take priority (Passenger, Interview, The Argus, 
April 26, 2014). 
Public interest and participation has been exceptionally uneven: in June 2015, only eight people 
turned up for the public engagement at the Site B community hall event to introduce MyCiTi 
Integrated Transport System’s plan for new bus routes in Khayelitsha 
(http://www.cptcommunity.co.za/MyCiTi-reaches-out-to-Khayelitsha/). 
Public meetings have been held in a range of affected communities including Table View, Big 
Bay, Milnerton, Dunoon, Atlantis, Camps Bay, Sea Point, City Bowl, Hout Bay and 
Melkbosstrand. Public meetings are called by the city as the service arrives in new areas (COCT 
2013). http://MyCiTi.org.za/docs/885/MyCiTi%20Stakeholder%20Guide%20-
%20January%202013.pdf).  
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Recent press reports have highlighted major problems: for example overcrowding on certain 
routes, long queues, poor ticking systems; staff not informed, strikes and litigation by some 
private stakeholders, no monitoring of busses and poor information and over servicing of 
‘tourist’ routes. 
 I catch the bus from town to Table View during the week and I am shocked 
and appalled at the following: excessive overloading of passengers, too few 
buses to cope with large numbers of commuters trying to get home from 3pm 
onwards, the timetable is not adhered to at all and the electronic screen has not 
worked for weeks, (IOL, Wheels come off MyCiTi,  April 26, 2014  2013). 
One newspaper editor argued that in the long run prices will increase and it will not be 
affordable for the poor (West Cape News, 12 October 2013). There is also evidence that the 
middle-class might stubbornly cling to private cars thereby vitiating a major aim of the ITR 
namely to decongest roads.  
As reported in the Argus, Natalie le Roux, who works in central Cape Town, said she stopped 
using the bus from Milnerton for a host of reasons. 
“We moved to Cape Town from Bloemfontein last year. I’ve had some good 
and bad experiences. Sometimes the buses are just too full. I used to wait in the 
morning for six buses to pass before I could take a bus. The buses are packed. I 
was put off from taking the bus because I get squashed like a sardine. They 
don’t clean the bus either. When you stand you have to hold on to the railings 
and it’s caked in dirt. I always have hand sanitisers and whenever I get out I 
sanitise my hands. (Weekend Argus MyCiTi bus service woes pile up, February 
8, 2015) 
Natalie Le Roux said she decided to drive with her car to work daily. Commuters have 
responded diversely: Negative views expressed in newspapers show daily frustrations. 
 The MyCiTi service is not good enough. Four buses have come and gone and 
I’m still unable to board a bus as they continue filling up again. When busses 
arrive at Table View station they are already loaded, hence we need empty 
busses to start loading at Table View. Come on, this is not service. I expect to 
board a bus every five minutes as was promised but this is not happening. –the 
MyCiTi is not even apologising for their weak service. 
 
Another passenger noted, 
 I catch the bus from town to Table View during the week and I am shocked 
and appalled at the following: excessive overloading of passengers, too few 
buses to cope with large numbers of commuters trying to get home from 3pm 
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onwards, the timetable is not adhered to at all and the electronic screen has not 
worked for weeks. (Cape Argus 14 August 2012) 
A MyCiTi bus public consultation meeting in Sea Point was  attended by approximately 200 
residents . Because of uncivil behaviour, the meeting had to be cut short and a date set for 
another meeting.  The residents claimed that the City’s engineers took rate payers for granted as 
it appeared that the City had already decided what it intended to do.  A resident Marlene van 
Duuren, said “feeder buses would ruin their quiet suburb …the feeder buses would devalue the 
properties”. Other residents agreed. “You haven’t taken into account that this is a nice quiet 
residential area and you want to turn it into a thoroughfare. “It’s a quiet neighbourhood. The 
City is bullying us. They have already made up their mind,” (Sharron Pearce, who has stayed in 
the area since 1976).   
In its statement the City said the introduction of a MyCiTi service in Sea Point, Bantry Bay and 
Fresnaye next year would offer residents “much-improved” public transport service. Routes 
would operate from the new Sea Point station, along Beach Road, Main Road and Regent Road, 
Victoria Road and High Level Road (MyCiTi bus routes launched, Cape Argus November 4, 
2013). The City (key informant Interview 2014) also took a long-term view arguing that wealthy 
ratepayers would see the benefits of having their domestic workers arrive on time and safely.  
The roll out in historically black areas such as Wynberg has been very contentious. In November 
20, 2014, Wynberg residents and taxi associations gathered in front of parliament protesting 
against the City of Cape Town's MyCiTi planned routes through Wynberg. Singing residents 
brandished posters saying: “BRT copy and pasted on apartheid road” and “national funding for 
city evictions”. The memorandum calls for a moratorium on “illegal South Road evictions” and 
the city’s “total disregard for the well-being of the Plumstead and Wynberg communities.” 
(CAPE ARGUS, November 20, 2014).  
Councillor Brett Herron, the city’s mayoral committee member for transport, instead hit back at 
the ANC: 
The ANC is playing a very dangerous and irresponsible game in working to 
sabotage a vital transport project that will benefit people from communities that 
are in desperate need for rapid, affordable, dignified and direct transport,.  
Mayor Patricia de Lille saw the attacks on public transport infrastructure are “well-orchestrated 
and driven by the desire to make the city ungovernable”. Golden Arrow stopped services from 
the Philippi, Nyanga, and Crossroads after violent attacks on its busses. Cosatu, condemned any 
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acts of violence, but suggested that “the mayor seems to be playing politics. It is clear that it is 
taxi drivers protesting and they have genuine concerns. The mayor should listen to those 
concerns and not play politics," (Mr Ehrenreich cited in Cape Argus, 2 Sept 2014).  
Cosatu  says it wants the equitable rollout of MyCiTi bus services in Cape Town. The union 
argues that “bus services in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha are substandard when compared to 
operations in other areas. Cosatu launched a court application against the City of Cape Town in 
2013. The federation's Tony Ehrenreich who also speaks as a community voice, noted.  
The roll out of MyCiTi buses is unfair, it’s discriminative, and it continues the 
disadvantages of apartheid. We want some steps to immediately equalise the 
facilities to the different communities, in this case it is between Milnerton, 
Blaauwberg, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain. It is not to the standard or to the 
levels of how it has been rolled out in Milnerton and Blouberg. 
 
Given these perceptions some believe that MyCiTi is in danger of being delegitimised. In the 
view of Pelzer and Fataar (2013), Cape Town is a “broken city held to ransom by powerful 
minority”. 
… the continuing opposition to Cape Town’s MyCiTi routes are proof of the 
status quo – in which thousands of commuters’ interests are held hostage to a 
smaller, but more highly organised, narrow-interest group.  
They argue that, “The MyCiTi integrated rapid-transit system, when fully integrated with 
density zoning and land-use planning over time, is intended to radically alter the fabric of the 
city. However, the system risks years of delay and the compromise of its routes due to the fact 
that the poor are least able to contribute formally to the public participation process”. 
 Conclusions 
From the above chapter, it is clear so far that the City, having committed vast amounts of funds,  
to the IRT, has no choice but to engage the communities and the public, making concessions her 
and there. It has met opposition but has largely been able to forge ahead as the new rollouts 
show.  Dissatisfaction of the public transport service provision is from diverse sources. Some of 
it may be about political manoeuvring and much may be sensationalised. Inasmuch, as the 
general public deserve safe and quality transport service provision, political and civil leaders 
have an obligation to safeguard the interests of the community and ensure that ratepayer’s 
money is wisely utilised. Furthermore, the MyCiTi is a national government priority, which 
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serves the province and country as well as locals. It is clear that organised local opposition has 
also shifted and that many communities both use and enjoy the service understanding that 
“teething” problems are inevitable. 
There are also strong sentiments among opposition political leaders that the rollout of the 
MyCiTi bus service was not equitably implemented. This sentiment was based on the premise 
that the MyCiTi bus service was initiated in rich communities with a high white population  as 
opposed to the poor communities in the townships. This has put the dispute in the political arena 
with Cosatu encouraging drivers to embark on strikes to address this inequality. However, in 
principle, there is no disagreement that a public system is needed to supersede private and taxi 
transport.  
From these various reports, it is clear that there are many dimensions and perceptions for 
opposing the operation of the MyCiTi bus services. Some have real and genuine concerns while 
other serving their own political and economic interests. Transparency and broad consultation 
could be one of the most effective ways forward in addressing this impasse. The reality however 
is, as a global tourist attraction, Cape Town is in need of an effective, efficient, safe and 
affordable transportation system.     
The key point is that the time to assess mega-projects is usually much longer than a few years 
with larger forces that were not anticipated play a role.  The MyCiTi plan runs up to 2030 and 
must perforce be protracted processes of incremental and radical changes that overcome deep 
spatial inequities on-going uncertainty about the competing minibus taxi industry, and major 
shifts in state and social dispositions especially from the middle class towards public transport, 
the environment responsibilities and a shared city life.  
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  Chapter 4 – Golden Arrow, Stakeholder 3  
Introduction 
This Chapter looks at how Golden Arrow Bus Services (GABS), one of the country’s  oldest 
public transport companies and also the main operator of scheduled public bus transport in Cape 
Town, is responding to the transformation of the public transport landscape and specifically how 
that impacts its core market at the base of the pyramid income segment.  Furthermore, it looks at 
a marketing strategy that would contribute to a more sustainable and financially viable transport 
system. 
The services offered by GAB are formalised in a contract, which was originally for a three year 
period, but now it has been extent (COCT, ITP 2013) Subsidies are provided by the national 
Department of Transport (DoT), which until 2009 was based on an agreed amount per passenger 
trip. This amount was negotiated between the operator and the DoT, but only applied to multi-
journey tickets (called “clip cards”). Single-journey tickets are unsubsidized and are sold at full 
fare – priced at a premium to encourage passengers to purchase clipcards, which would increase 
the subsidy to GABS.  
In 2009, this model was changed, on instructions of National Treasury, to a kilometre-based 
subsidy, removing the need for GABS to discourage single trips. In addition, government has 
given notice to the bus industry that it needs to broaden the access to subsidies, which is likely 
to reduce the money flows to bus companies over time. A key mechanism for broadening 
subsidies in cities putting in place BRT operations, is to reallocate bus subsidies for previous 
scheduled bus services to new BRT operations (where subsidies are required). 
Overview on Golden Arrow as one of the licence operators 
Golden Arrow as a provincially managed and subsidised commuter bus services are mainly 
funded by the nine provincial governments through the Public Transport Operations Grant 
(PTOG) system in accordance with Schedule 4 of the Division of Revenue Act (DORA). These 
funds are transferred via the Department of Transport (DoT) to the provinces for contracted 
commuter bus operations (DoT, 2013a:153). This is a conditional grant that can only be used for 
provincially contracted bus commuter services. Furthermore, in terms of the (DoT, 2013a:154, 
163) provisions, the commuter rail system is funded by the DoT through the transfer of funds 
from the DoT to the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA).  
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According to a Golden Arrows Fact Sheets published June 2008, between 1997 and 1999, a 
number of competitive tender contracts were already entered into with bus operators. 
Subsequently, between 1999 and 2001, the process gained momentum but was brought to a halt 
after a court case in the Western Cape where the local operator, Golden Arrow Bus Services, 
took the DoT to court for failing to meet the requirements of the (NLTTA). These stipulated that 
services had to be put out to tender, based on public transport plans. The additional concerns 
raised  with government was the substantially higher costs of the competitive tenders compared 
to the original subsidy system which  was replaced (see Walters & Cloete, 2010) and the lack of 
sustainable funds to fund the contracting system. At that time organised labour voiced their 
concerns about the impact of the tendering system on job security and wage levels. This caused 
the DoT to put a moratorium on further competitive tenders in 2001 (DoT, 2012:10).  
In a further development in 2009, the National Treasury and the DoT informed the bus industry 
that all interim contracts (ICs) had to be converted to kilometre-based contracts in order to limit 
the subsidy claims of operators (DoT, 2009). Prior to 2009, these contracts were all used a 
passenger subsidy base – the more passengers that were carried, the higher the operator’s claims. 
These operators experienced substantial passenger growth over a prolonged period because of a 
vibrant South African economy and inroads being made into the taxi industry market. This 
resulted in increased and unpredictable subsidy claim amounts, which complicated and put 
heavy strain on the DoT budget. Following the conversion of these contracts to kilometre-based 
contracts, all contracts were ‘frozen’ at the agreed kilometres that operators produced under their 
respective contracts (Cornelius, 2014). No additional subsidised kilometres were allowed. Other 
forms of contracting, such as tendered and negotiated contracts, were already kilometre-based 
and limited to the originally agreed upon network kilometres in those contracts.  
Memorandum of understanding between City of Cape Town & Golden Arrow  
After many debates and talks, the City of Cape Town, the Western Cape government, and 
Golden Arrow Bus Services signed two memorandums of understanding on working together to 
establish an integrated, world-class transport system, on 8 June 2014. The signing of the 
memorandums was to pave the way for a smoother implementation of the integrated transport 
system in the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape which has in the past experiencing 
many difficulties. 
During 2013, Golden Arrow approached the High Court in Cape Town claiming the negotiations 
for the rollout of the MyCiTi bus system with the city were not legitimate. The transport 
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company had asked the court to refer the discussions for mediation, but at the end the court 
dismissed the application. Golden Arrow’s concern was the percentage of the stake that it would 
get in the two phases of the MyCiTi service, and whether it was entitled to a payment for 
decommissioning buses and mothballing some of its assets. 
One of the memoranda serves as a departure point for the imminent integration of the Golden 
Arrow and MyCiTi bus services to establish one bus service with unified branding, one 
timetable and one scheduling system linked to the integrated public transport network. The 
memorandum also acknowledges Golden Arrow as a significant role player, and will also be 
contracted as a scheduled bus service operator. The mayoral committee member for transport, 
roads and storm water, Mr Brett Herron  in his address of 2013 reiterated that:  
The objectives of the two memorandums of understanding was to ensure a 
smooth and seamless transition process; to lay the foundations of a good 
working relationship between the different role players, and to establish the 
basis for an adequately resourced and expanding road-based scheduled public 
transport service.  
Brett Herron (2013) declared that Cape Town was committed to transforming all aspects of the 
city’s transport network and operations, in realising its vision of a "world-class, affordable, 
integrated, and intermodal" transport system for the benefit of all residents. 
Under the current provision, different transport services are being managed by different spheres 
of government. Mr Herron said the aim was to transform this system by locating the 
management of all operations at local government level to facilitate this integration.  
Transport for Cape Town (TCT) will lead this transformation process, of which 
affordability and cost competitiveness form an integral part.  As outlined in the 
first memorandum of understanding, the city, under the auspices of Transport 
for Cape Town (TCT) (May 2014), will work with the Western Cape 
government through the Department of Transport and Public Works, which will 
provide advice, guidance and support, as well as performing a key oversight 
role to facilitate the smooth transition.  
Western Cape transport and public works MEC Robin Carlisle (2014) said these are the first two 
of a series of memorandums required in terms of the Western Cape Provincial Land Transport. 
Golden Arrow spokeswoman Bronwen Dyke claimed that the signing of the memorandums 
“provides a strong basis for the long-term relationship between Golden Arrow and the 
contracting  authority, which can only be to the benefit of public transport users" (Phakathi, 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Market share 
In order to properly allocate shares between bus companies and taxi associations, a model was 
developed that could account for subsidies received by the bus companies (Integrated Rapid 
Transit System, Fare Policy Technical Document 2010). The best method for determining 
market share was considered to be passengers per mode as confirmed by surveys (e.g. bus or 
minibus-taxi) times the fare each passenger paid (the number “x” for purposes of the discussion 
that follows) – subject to adjustments discussed below. 
The City conducted preference surveys of bus passengers which asked: “If the fare for riding the 
bus was the same as riding a taxi, would you continue using the bus or would you switch to 
minibus-taxis?” The response was that 80% of bus passengers would stay on the bus. Moreover, 
the survey showed that even if the bus fare was significantly higher than taxi fares, a large 
percentage of passengers would still choose the bus service – because of perceived higher levels 
of road safety and passenger security. The survey indicated that, if the bus fares increased to the 
equivalent of taxi fares, 20% of passengers would shift away from buses to taxis. In terms of this 
first model, then, the market share between bus companies and taxi associations would be 
adjusted by taking the number x (the proportion of passengers using bus services) and adjusting 
it downwards by 20%. In 2011 study GABs had a 5 percent market share of affected routes 
(COCT, 2012a: 124).  
Financial implications  
In the 2012/13 financial year, Golden Arrow received a R696 million subsidy from the 
provincial government to provide transport across the City. From 2010, the few MyCiTi routes 
operating had cost the City R175 million by June 2012 with an income of R35 million, a 
situation Golden Arrow says is financially unsustainable. The total annual Public Transport 
Operating Grant paid to the Provincial Government of the Western Cape for operational 
subsidies for bus services, of which almost all is paid to Golden Arrow Bus Services for services 
supplied within the area of the City of Cape Town, was R796 million in 2015/16 (RSA, Division 
of Revenue, 2015). 
Golden Arrow operates within a very particular business environment. While it is run as a 
private company, its independence and autonomy, certainly more than in other industries, are 
limited by heavy government regulation and an unusual competition landscape. Golden Arrow is 
a capital-intensive operation with high cash flows. Bus fleets cost huge amounts of capital to 
acquire, operate, and maintain. Overhead costs are also very high and any slowdown or stoppage 
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has an almost immediate effect on the firm’s financial situation. Golden Arrow’s autonomy is 
often constrained by government regulation and restrictions. Since 1997,  the main basis of the 
relationship between public authorities and GABS is the Interim Contract, originally supposed 
to last only for three years. (Public Transport Plan. Draft for Public Consultation,June 2006).   
This Interim Contract is still in place ten years later, and is currently renewed on a monthly 
basis. No new routes have been approved by government since 2002, despite considerable 
demand in some of Cape Town’s new residential areas. The network that GABS operates is 
therefore not always strictly based on business considerations but also to an extent determined 
by political priorities. This hampers the company’s ability to do forward planning and makes 
efficient capital resource management very difficult. Bus designs and specifications are also 
determined by government rather than GABS itself, and this can create further issues as the bus 
types operated are not always ideally suitable for public urban transport. 
Crime and insecurity have a big impact on GABS as it partly operates in high risk areas at very 
late hours. There is an additional operating cost involved in providing protection to staff and 
passengers in the form of security guards, and reinforced, protective cabins for bus drivers. Of 
course addressing the causes of crime does not form part of Golden Arrow’s mandate, but it has 
an obvious business interest in taking preventive measures both on its vehicles and around the 
boarding facilities 
Conclusions 
The business model of the City of Cape Town was strongly opposed by the bus companies, who 
argued that even if an adjustment downwards was justifiable due to the benefit they have had in 
government subsidies –this method doubly disadvantaged them. On reflection, the City 
conceded that the first step has probably already brought about a sufficient adjustment. In 
addition, it had to take into account that, in addition to decreasing the fare to passengers, the 
existing subsidies also increase the quality of service. Using both these methods cumulatively 
placed the bus companies at an unfair disadvantage to the taxi associations when calculating 
market share, and thus the City settled on using the first method only. 
The bus companies argued that the City’s method disadvantaged them because the City intended 
to pay compensation to minibus-taxi operators, but not to bus companies (May 2013). However, 
the City rejected this argument because National Government had set a policy objective that 
cities had to attempt to ensure that minibus-taxi operators are, on a balance, not worse off due to 
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BRT / IRT compared to how they would have been had it not been introduced. National 
Government did not set a similar policy objective regarding bus companies. 
Thus, the City’s current model for determining relative market share between the two modes 
(scheduled bus services and minibus-taxis) was confirmed as follows: the cash fare paid 
passengers (e.g. excluding subsidies paid to the bus companies) times the number of passengers 
paying that fare. It is believed that this method provides the most accurate market share between 
bus companies and the taxi industry. 
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 Chapter 5:  From Minibus Taxis to Vehicle Operating Company:    
Stakeholder 4 
Introduction 
Perhaps the most important business stakeholder is the taxi industry, which became a 
beneficiary of “one of the largest empowerment deals in South Africa … valued at over R4,5 
billion’ in 2009 (cited in Diaz 2009).  The taxi industry as the main provider of mass transport 
and main competitor to a public system is also the key to the “business model” of IRT. In this 
chapter, I want to contextualise this in order to understand in some detail how the IRT operation 
is meant to work as a public-private partnership and how taxi-owners and drivers relate to other 
stakeholders. One of the chief tenets of the business model was that on average minibus-taxi 
operators should not be worse off in the new system. 
The minibus-taxi sector of the South African public transport industry, as noted earlier, was 
formed historically by small black entrepreneurs during the years of apartheid. Large groups of 
township dwellers who were seeking job opportunities in other parts of the city had no means of 
travelling there. Thus, a new industry developed informally and remains only partially regulated 
to date (Schalekamp, Behrens & Wilkinson, 2007). 
One major result of the lack of formal oversight has been the growth of informal protection 
circles within the industry. The taxi associations in control of a set of minibus-taxi routes often 
resorted to violence to protect the interests of their members. The association system fitted into a 
hierarchical structure beginning at the local level and reaching the level of national taxi 
groupings. 
The minibus-taxi industry operates with the one objective of maximizing profit. They generally 
travel quickly and in cut throat competition with one another to pick up passengers which often 
means dangerous driving and no predictability in arrivals. It is also common that vehicles are 
under-maintained which also results in dangerous conditions. Drivers often work extremely long 
hours under these dangerous conditions and with no health benefits or job security (Walters 
2013).  
The movement of the taxi industry from this kind of  informality to the formal sector presented a 
big challenge to the association leadership but also a major opportunity to reorganise cities. The 
first challenge was how this was going to be done by associations. The fear was that as the 
leadership they were going to lose control of the association and that they were not going to 
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have a place in the new companies. Secondly they were wondering why there must be a 
company in order for them to participate in the project.   
In Cape Town by 2009 only eight associations out of 104 operating locally (COCT, 2007) had 
been engaged, and with varying degrees of success (COCT 2009a). “The remaining majority of 
paratransit stakeholders have not been successfully engaged on the role that city and national 
governments have envisioned for them in the new networks, claiming a lack of consultation and 
insufficient evidence of improved business and employment prospects” (Schalekamp, Behrens 
and Wilkenson, 2010).  
Taxi Owners and Drivers 
Drivers play a major part in the economics of the taxi industry even though they are not formally 
organised. Each owner employs his or her drivers and the terms of employment are usually 
determined between the employer and the employee.  But the salary is generally determined by 
what is offered in that route by the majority of owners.  The salary of the driver is usually 
determined by the amount that is typically made by the taxi on a daily basis.  For example, 
drivers on routes that make about R300 a day are paid between R600 and R800 a week (The 
Star, July 2012).  
It is important to note that the money made by each taxi a day is not always determined by the 
number of passengers but by drivers themselves. In each route drivers come together and discuss 
usually how much cash they are supposed to pass through to their bosses a day. So a new driver 
would ask other drivers how much do they give to their bosses a day and that is what he will 
then pass through to the boss. If he makes more money, then the rest belongs to him. 
In some areas, the owner does not pay the driver salary.  The driver is obliged to bring a fixed 
amount of money from Monday to Friday. During weekends, the driver works for himself and 
all the money collected on Saturday and Sunday is pocketed by the driver.  In other instances, 
the drivers are requested to bring a fixed amount of money on a daily basis and any extra money 
made every day will then belong to a driver. For example, the driver will be required to bring 
R500 every day and if he makes more than R500 he then keeps the rest as his payment or salary. 
There is no advantage in any of these kinds of payments as the driver pockets excess money 
anyway. In some instances drivers are promoted to owner level after a number of years of 
service in the association.  In one association a driver can work for a number of owners and 
depending on the behaviour of the specific driver and how acceptable he is to other owners, he is 
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then promoted to become an owner and is required to purchase his vehicle and is normally not 
required to pay exorbitant amounts to join the association. 
In a number of associations when the owners hire a driver no contract is signed and no drivers’ 
license is required and only the ability to drive is the prerequisite. The owners usually ask other 
drivers whether the person can drive or tests him. After the test for the ability to drive is 
conducted then the person gets the job. 
In other associations the drivers are required to submit their Drivers’ Licenses, Public Drivers 
Permit, and an Identity Document (ID) and to also complete a form that will be kept with his 
owners file.  The records of the date for the renewal of the PDPs are kept and drivers are 
reminded to renew their PDPs. 
A few years ago the South African Transport and Allied Workers Unions (SATAWU) started 
organizing drivers in the taxi industry (Barrett, 2003).The efforts of the unions were fruitless as 
there is high turnover among the taxi drivers and owners were reluctant to employ drivers using 
the formal means of signing contracts.  Secondly, the owners resorted to employing relatives 
who did not want to be unionized.  
When the driver is sick or the car is involved in an accident the owner does not pay him. Instead 
when the driver is sick the owner finds one of the relatives to drive the vehicles or a temporary 
driver. In late 2014 protests in Nyanga, (Cape Argus, 13 July 2014) a taxi driver complained that 
he cannot afford the hefty fines which have tripled since August. “I don’t have enough to pay 
R11,000 on one ticket because we don’t even make a R1,000. If we are lucky, we make R500 so 
how can I pay that?” It is however important to emphasize that the drivers wield a lot of power 
in some of the associations. There have been instances where the drivers have been used by 
some of the owners. In instances where there are disputes within the same association,  owners 
have used the drivers to fight their battles. For example, owners organize drivers to protest 
against the leadership and force elections and re-elections in the association.  
Consider a driver aged 40, who has been a taxi driver for the past eight years under the 
Blaauwberg Taxi Association (BTA) in Atlantis. He is now working as a MyCiTi bus driver 
employed by the Kidrogen (a VOC), and earning R7200 per month before deductions. But as a 
taxi driver, he earned about R13 000 a month. He believes that about 60% of his colleagues at 
BTA are now unemployed following the roll out of the MyCiTi bus service along the west coast 
corridor. Now, together with unemployed taxi drivers, they have teamed up with other taxi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
bosses and drivers in Witsand and they are forming a taxi association to operate taxi’s as the 
service was in high demand in the area., “But their taxi service was likely to be operating 
illegally, as City has stopped issuing operating licenses in the areas where MyCiTi is operating. 
In the meantime, Hout Bay taxi bosses share the same grievances.” (West Cape News, 10 
November 2014).  
Taxi Owners’ concerns 
To kick-start the IRT process and get buy-in from key taxi industry leaders in the area of the 
proposed first phase of the IRT project, city officials organised a study tour. The itinerary 
included visits to Brazil and Columbia, in particular Bogota, which at the time was regarded as 
the global cutting edge of BRT implementation. An important part of the Bogota model 
involved the informal para-transit sector being incorporated into running the companies 
operating the buses. The visit to the Columbian capital included intensive meetings with 
informal transport operators, including some of the operators that were not involved in its BRT 
system.   
Taxi-owners would cease operations (forgo licences and scrap vehicles) and be compensated for 
this. They could then take the cash or buy shares in organised formations/associations were to 
form companies, which would co-own the MyCiTi through 12 year contracts. From the early 
planning stages, it was envisaged that MyCiTi would operate as a monopoly. This decision was 
formalised in the second version of the prospectus which stated that  
No other road-based public transport would be allowed to run on the IRT 
routes, subject to the provisions of the National Land Transport Act, unless pre-
authorized by the IRT Agency and does not compete with a significant portion 
of the IRT service. (COCT, Business Plan Amendments, February 2011) 
Taxi operators’ frustrations spilled out in their march on 9 December 2008, where a 
memorandum of grievances from the Western Cape National Taxi Alliance’s CATA and 
CODETA was presented to the Mayor of Cape Town. The Memorandum demanded that: 
 all BRT projects and processes should stop immediately, pending proper 
consultation, presentation of business financial model that guarantees that 
operators be better off and also giving the projected guaranteed figures for at 
least five years, by all the tiers of government” (Cape Argus, 9 December 
2008). 
The Western Cape National Taxi Alliance (WCNTA) insisted that the City of Cape Town took 
the WCPTC to Bogota and they failed to report back to the industry about the outcome of the 
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study tour.  WCNTA therefore claimed that their lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
project stem from that.  They emphasized that the taxi industry is not opposed to public transport 
in principle but they need to be adequately consulted so that they can be in a position to engage 
with their members on the project. 
These were the key questions in the petition to the City by the taxi owners: 
Why they were not consulted? 
Who will own the buses? 
Who are the owners of the proposed company? 
Jobs are going to be lost;  
drivers, fare collectors and vehicle cleaners and job security 
Who will manage the bus stations/stops? 
What will happen to the entrepreneurs operating at current Interchanges? 
Outstanding permits applications  
The City’s Mayoral Committee Member for Transport, Councillor Brett Herron and the 
Executive Director: Transport, Roads and Stormwater, Ms Melissa Whitehead, met with Mr 
Vernon Billet and Mr Mandla Mata, respectively the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of 
SANTACO Western Cape, and a number of other prominent members of the local mini-bus taxi 
industry. The SANTACO leadership voiced their concerns that they had not been consulted on 
the City’s plans for the improvement of public transport in Cape Town and specifically in 
relation to the further rollout of the MyCiTi to the Metro South East or Cape Flats. 
According to my key informant, the taxi industry confronted a problem of shifting from 
structured as associations into companies and they wanted to know why they had to be 
“companies” first before they participate in the project. They were eager to know how small 
entities would be accommodated and who would finally own the project and who would own the 
buses? What is the role of government in the project? Which routes of the associations will be 
affected? Will the taxi industry be able to participate in other business areas of the project? 
(Interview with COCT key informant, 7 May 2014) 
Compensation model in the transition  
Since the project’s inception, it had been understood that the City would compensate affected 
minibus-taxi operators in associations for giving up their businesses. The City offered such fair 
compensation to the taxi industry operators, subject to approval by the national government.  
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The  mini-bus taxi owner should not be worse off after compensation. According to the 
Integrated Rapid Transit System,(2010) approved by the City of Cape Town council, it was 
suggested  that legitimate profits should be the basis for determining whether operators are equal 
or better off in the new system, as compared to the old system. Legitimate profit is determined 
using assumed average costs across the area for the value of the vehicle, payment of driver, 
maintenance, insurance, tax etc. Thus, to determine market share between minibus-taxi 
associations, the City used the calculated average legitimate profits within each association 
(COCT, 2010a). The city conducted surveys of taxi-operators. Since the City’s proposal (2010) 
it will be based on its surveyed passengers per individual operator, some operators may not have 
carried any passengers on the day or days the survey was executed (e.g. because the vehicle is in 
for repairs). On the other hand, merely because one vehicle was out of operation does not mean 
that fewer passengers would have travelled on the relevant date(s). Thus, the survey would have 
picked up all the relevant passengers who travelled on that day, but would have allocated them 
to the operators who actually moved them on that day. 
The associations would know whether operators who were out of operation on the survey dates 
have a legitimate claim of the passengers who were actually moved on those dates. Thus the 
City requires of associations to make proposals to it on how the compensation should be divided 
between operators.  
The impacted operator had two forms of compensation: one for the cash value of their existing 
business and leaving the business entirely; and the other obtaining shares in the new VO 
company to which they have been assigned. 
Figure 4: elements of the formula for compensation  
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Stakeholder Conflicts and Meetings 
From the beginning of 2013 there will be stakeholder meetings once a month.  These meetings 
would run parallel to the broader consultation process. Councillor Brett Herron (COCT, Media 
release, 2012) noted: 
I would like to state categorically that we cannot take public transport to the 
next level of integration in our city without the mini-bus taxi industry – this 
industry is a crucial part of our future plans for public transport. The City has a 
proposal designed to improve public transport for the close to one million 
Capetonians that daily climb onto trains, mini-bus taxis and buses to connect 
with opportunities. This proposal is not cast in concrete and we will work 
together to achieve better public transport for our people. I am confident that 
we all share a common goal. 
Mr Vernon Billet (of taxi association) argued:  
We must speak to one another until we understand where you want to take us as 
a city - that is our collective responsibility. We are not opposed to improving 
the public transport system, we welcome this, but do it with us, please continue 
to take us into the City of Cape Town’s confidence. (cited in Integrated 
Strategic Communication and Branding Department, City of Cape Town 2009). 
The Peninsula Taxi Association (PTA) evolved into Peninsula Holdings. Peninsula Holdings 
was established as the business arm of the PTA, which has a membership of around 150 and is 
one of more than 160 informal taxi associations in Cape Town, Western Cape.  
Formalising had many advantages. It put us on track to negotiate and participate in many 
projects such as The Jammie Shuttle (The University of Cape Town’s transport system),  
“We are the first in the transport industry to investigate, negotiate and participate in the widely 
publicised Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system. This put us on track to negotiate and secure a 77% 
shareholding in TransPeninsula Investments, the company that was awarded the World Cup 
2010 Public Transport Contract”. (http://peninsulaholdings.co.za/) 
“The DuNoon Taxi Association (DTA) which has a fleet of 180 taxis with 70 owners, used to be 
the major public transport provider for people commuting along the R27 west coast. Although 
contracts are in place to compensate the taxi owners for lost revenue as well as to incorporate 
the taxis into the feeder routes in Parklands and surround suburbs, to date (since May 2011) 
there has been no compensation provided. This article presents both sides of the situation and 
outlines the two options that are currently being considered for concluding the problem. Part of 
the delay in compensation is due to awaiting data from a survey designed to determine how 
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many of the commuters had moved from using DTA taxis to MyCiTi buses.” (Luhanga, P. 
2011).  
Mandatory compensation model 
It is important to note that the compensation models was changed over time. When a strategy for 
compensation was initially devised, it was thought that those affected operators not wishing to 
be a part of the IRT system could voluntarily opt out, while all those desiring to play a role in 
the system would have the opportunity to do so. The original compensation model, for this 
voluntary system did not see the necessity of MyCiTi monopoly on affected routes:  
The City would offer a specific amount of compensation based on market share, the net present 
value of current profits in the minibus-taxi industry over a period of one to seven years 
(depending on period of validity of the relevant operating licences).  In addition a vehicle 
scrapping allowance  (about R63000 on average per older vehicle) would be paid. In return, the 
operator would sign a waiver of any legal rights to operate minibus-taxis in the relevant area, 
and would need to agree to meet the requirements to reduce their fleets relative to the minibus-
taxi routes being eliminated in this phase (e.g. through scrapping processes). After the opt-out 
contract has been awarded and signed, the City would pay the negotiated compensation directly 
to the relevant operator. 
This scheme was adjusted to the mandatory compensation model, since it was felt that the City 
needed to play a central role in allocating compensation to individual taxi operators to avoid 
conflict within the industry. 
The voluntary compensation model was appropriate for a scenario in which the IRT system 
could accommodate as many existing operators as wished to be involved. Since most taxi 
associations do not yet operate as formal companies, the market share of each operator in each 
association had to be determined. The following approach was adopted to allow each operator to 
exercise his/her rights based on the options available. 
In addition to the calculation of legitimate profit as was used for determining market share of a 
given taxi association, the value of a taxi business is determined based in part on the validity 
period of the operating license of a given taxi operator. Three categories of taxi licenses are 
considered in this calculation: indefinite license holders, definite license holders, and “semi-
legal” operators. For the purpose of calculating the value of the operating license, the validity 
period of these three categories of operators are considered to be: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
   Table 4: Taxi Licenses 
Category Period 
Indefinite License 7 years 
Definite license 3 years 
Unlicensed (semi-legal) operator 1 year 
 
The value of the operating license is determined by calculating the total modelled legitimate 
profit (see table 4 in this thesis) over the above periods relative to the category of license, and 
converting it to a net present value. This calculation is done per association or route (or groups 
of routes) to determine the average total value for each category of operator in that association 
or on that route, producing an indefinite pot, a definite pot, and an unlicensed pot.  
According to this model, if the average operator invests his entire compensation amount in 
shares, the dividend yield would be about the same as his current profits (provided the company 
is run relatively well, and thus yield reasonable dividends). 
The City will need to ensure that individual operators are consulted and fairly treated by the 
association. The City will therefore require of the association to demonstrate that a substantial 
majority of their members support the association’s proposal on how to distribute the 
compensation.  
Associations put forward excessive compensation and other demands but in the end the City was 
able to settle at lower amounts. According to a key informant the “taxi owner should not be 
worse off” after agreeing to transition to a company. By 2013 a few taxi owners left the industry 
but most converted to into shareholders on IRT (Key informant, 2014).  
Three companies were registered and long-term contracts were signed for with them.  Taxi-
owners on affected routes as noted migrated into VOCs. In order for members of the existing 
directly affected operators to formally operate the IRT system, they have to form privately-held 
companies (COCT, Operating Licence Strategy, July 2013). Directly affected operators refer to 
those whose services are proposed to be replaced and upgraded by the IRT, namely minibus-
taxis and scheduled buses in the Phase 1A area. They were expected to give up their current 
rights in the Phase 1A area in return for either: shares in the companies contracted to operate the 
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new system; compensation or a combination of part shares and part compensation. These 
operators would form these VOC companies, but may in addition bring on board other non-
affected partners. (COCT, 2012b) 
 
By 2012 three VOCs had 12 year contracts with the City  -- Transpeninsula Investments (TPI), 
Table Bay Area Rapid Transit (TBART) and Kidrogen. The VOCs are contractually bound to 
provide an efficient level of service and are subject to penalties for infringements.  If there are 
illegal taxi operators who are members of the above VOCs such VOCs will be penalised (CoCT, 
2012b; CTC Press release, 20 March 2014) 
Profitability 
One of the chief tenets of the business model that on average minibus-taxi operators should not 
be worse off in the new system than it is today, whether they choose to go only for 
compensation, only for shareholding or for a mix of the two. But when the City did a financial 
model for the VO companies, this proved not to be the case. The problem was that; 
The City’s financial model for the VO company was based generally on the financial model of 
TransMilenio in Bogota, which held that profits would be based on a return on investment by 
the shareholders. That is, a certain level of profit is planned for, as a percentage of annual 
investments.  
In Cape Town, however, the VO companies are not expected to purchase their own vehicles, and 
then include the finance costs and amortisation as a component of their proposed kilometre rate.  
The City decided to purchase the vehicles itself from a capital grant provided by national 
government. The VO companies in Cape Town would be investing significantly less than their 
counterparts in Bogota. 
So a new approach was taken: instead of setting profits relative to the VOs’ level of investment, 
the City proposed to set it as a percentage of annual operator turnover. The City’s proposal is to 
set profits at 15% of turnover per annum, averaged over the 12 years of the life of the contract.  
By migrating from a system based on fee-per-passenger to a fee-per-kilometre, the system 
prioritises greater quality of service rather than higher operator profits. However, in many BRT 
systems, the introduction of exclusive lanes for buses and methods of rapid boarding can 
compensate for these losses by improving operator efficiency.  
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The Business Model and Taxis 
The basic concept was that the city (using national grant funding) would initially purchase and 
then make busses available to VOCs at no cost.  This would allow VOCs to operate the service 
while maintaining the vehicles. The VOC would invoice the city for its service on a per 
scheduled kilometre basis, while the city collected all fares. The per km basis (variable charge) 
was complemented with a fixed charge invoiced by VOCs.  
The City’s IRT team recognised that the fee per kilometre rate paid to the VOCs would be a 
most important area of negotiation between the City and the three companies – and would be 
settled by way of a final proposal submitted by each VO Company (subject to City acceptance). 
This fee per kilometre would be a unique figure for each kind of vehicle and would need to be 
high enough to cover their operating costs for all services, all capital investments and other 
equipment. The pre-operational costs, the performance guarantee and a reasonable rate of profit 
would also be included. The companies would have to have a reasonable level of management 
and efficiency (COCT, 2012b: 67-9). In this way, they would not be competing for passengers: 
unlike taxis, they would no longer have an incentive to cut in front of other buses to capture 
passengers, or wait at a station until their bus or minibus becomes full.  
Penalties apply to VOCs who perform poorly or damage buses. VOCs have to submit quarterly 
reports and have an investment plan because they will have to have enough cash to buy their 
own vehicles once the first phase was completed. VOC’s profits would be taxed.  In order to be 
eligible to sign the final operating contract with the IRT Entity, the companies were required to 
meet the following minimum eligibility criteria: 
Capital – Each firm must have minimum capital required to pay a performance guarantee to the 
City, plus an additional sum for legal and administrative costs in case of a contractual default. 
Additionally, each firm must be able to supply the initial investments in all equipment and 
furniture other than the vehicles, and the working capital required during the pre-operational 
period. (COCT, October 2010a) 
Expertise – Each VO company must demonstrate that it has the necessary expertise to run a 
world-class IRT/BRT system, and that it has made sufficient arrangements for international 
advice and experience. 
Staff – Each VO company will need to demonstrate that they will have a sufficient number of 
certified drivers capable of operating the buses. 
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Management – The company had to provide sufficient information to the City to show that it 
would be able to adequately manage bus operations. 
Scrapping of vehicles – Each vehicle operating company had to provide a prescribed number of 
old minibus-taxis, equivalent to the number of minibus-taxis on the affected routes, to avoid 
such vehicles flooding the rest of the city thereby leading to conflict with other taxi operations. 
They had to surrender licenses representing the value of at least 60% of licenses in the area. The 
60% figure was set once the City `realized that any higher figure may be too difficult to force 
onto the operators via their associations. Any lower figure would seriously begin to undermine 
the financial viability of the IRT system (MyCiTi, Business Plan 2012). 
Company structures 
No shareholder from one company may hold shares in the other company. This provision 
enhances the level of competition between the VO companies – a key principle of the IRT 
system’s business plan – by avoiding collusion between them.  
According to the City, it did not have the final say on the composition of shareholders within the 
Phase 1A companies, it was able to work with the taxi associations and recommend models for 
shareholding within companies.   The big decision with regards to shareholding for the company 
groups was whether individual members from within taxi associations and bus companies 
should hold shares within the VO companies or whether shares should be held at higher 
(perhaps association) levels. 
By promoting a structure whereby all affected bus and taxi operators became shareholders, the 
process would be more democratic and “association loyalty” would eventually become less 
strong. However, the City also believed that by having too many shareholders, the process 
would become unwieldy and would slow negotiations and ultimately, operations. 
It was therefore the City’s preference that shares be held at higher levels. The result was a two-
tiered system: 
1. Associations-turned-companies: Shareholders in the VO companies would be companies 
formed out of and corresponding to each taxi association (and possibly a bus company too), 
identified by the City to be directly affected and thus potentially part of the two VO companies. 
Shares in the VO companies would thus be held at the level of the “sub-companies” formed by 
each association. 
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2.  Owners and operators: At the lowest tier are the shareholders of the sub-companies formed 
by associations (that make up the VO companies, i.e., the shareholders of the association-based 
companies that form the shareholders of the operating company). This includes individual bus 
and taxi operators, previously members of these associations, who would become shareholders 
in their parent companies. 
Because of this, the City made the stipulation that for the first five years of the vehicle operating 
contract, shares cannot be sold outside the shareholders of the VO company, except in the case 
where an increase in capital is required, in which case the reduction may not be more than 50% 
of the total participation. However, shares may be traded between shareholders of the Company, 
up to a maximum shareholding of 33% of shares in the VO Company in the hands of a single 
legal entity (including subsidiaries or parent company of that entity) or of a natural person. After 
five years, stock holders have the option to sell their shares to outside parties. (COCT, Business 
plan 2012b) 
Additionally, in the case where an operator is currently a member of more than one association 
or bus company falling into different company groups as determined by the City, the City has 
proposed that he or she is only permitted to hold shares in one – to enhance competition between 
the companies. This requirement is still under discussion. 
Finally, all of the existing operators who accept compensation, shares in the new company, or a 
combination between the two must unconditionally waive their right to any possible further 
compensation. 
Shares were allocated to companies based on market share. Once shares had been allocated to 
companies, each company would distribute its allocation to individual operators through steps 
described in Compensation. This allows associations include “semi-legal operators”, namely 
those who have applied for licenses but who have not been awarded such licences – whether for 
sound policy reasons or because of inefficiencies in the processing of licence applications.  
The City would then receive the planned allocation of license points to owners/operators and 
verify it for fairness. Once satisfied, the City would issue a License Point Certificate to each 
operator. 
Payment by companies to shareholders 
Early on in the process, the plan was to recommend that VO companies provide an option to 
their shareholders to release estimated profits to them regularly, e.g., every two weeks. This 
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would be unlike a traditional stock holding company, which usually releases a portion profits by 
way of dividends at the end of its financial year. The rationale behind this recommendation was 
that in the current system minibus-taxi operators receive payment on a daily basis. To move to a 
yearly receipt of payment would likely be too drastic and unsustainable to the incomes of those 
in the taxi industry, many of whose lives depend on a steady inflow of cash. At the time, though, 
the City did not intend to actually prescribe this provision – it was only intended as a 
recommendation. 
While this remains the case, the City has made further moves to help ensure that this provision is 
made. First, the City is willing to support a tax-efficient mechanism that allows a more frequent 
payment to operators, provided that the VO company has settled this matter among shareholders 
and described in detail its proposed mechanisms for doing so. 
The mechanism recommended by the City is that VO companies establish a taxi industry 
dividend equalization fund for the shareholders from the minibus-taxi industry. This does not 
really constitute dividends, but in effect comprises a loan to the company funded by its taxi 
shareholders, which in turn is funded from the compensation paid by the City to minibus-taxi 
operators. The company will repay this loan to taxi shareholders at regular intervals, thereby 
providing a steady income to these shareholders for the start-up years of this company. 
As indicated, the taxi shareholders would, in addition to other funding to be contributed, have to 
contribute an additional amount to the capitalisation of the VO companies sufficient to capitalise 
the taxi industry dividend equalisation fund (which could be set up as a loan fund), e.g., by using 
compensation offered by the City, vehicle scrapping allowances or private funds. They would do 
so in proportion to the shareholding that they intend to take up in the VO company. 
The equalisation fund would then be used to “top up” the actual annual dividend pay-outs to taxi 
shareholders during the initial period of operations when no annual dividend pay-outs may be 
made, or any dividends paid are likely to be below the estimated average annual dividend (as 
calculated over the full period of the contract). 
Once the point is reached where the actual annual dividend exceeds the average annual 
dividend, such annual excess can be distributed as final repayment of this loan to taxi 
shareholders.  
Obviously the forecasted annual dividends and the estimated average annual dividends cannot 
be guaranteed. Thus, if a VO company’s performance is worse than predicted, its taxi 
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shareholders would have to share the risk in the same way as any other shareholders. However, 
if the company’s performance is better than predicted, the point where the actual annual 
dividend exceeds the average annual dividend will be reached earlier, and the loan can also be 
paid back to the taxi shareholders earlier thus in effect comprising a self-funded “bonus”. 
The conclusion was projected VO profits in the IRT system would be significantly lower than 
operator profits in the current system (approximately one-quarter of their current profits). The 
solution then was to offer compensation to all minibus-taxis operators, which the operators 
could use to obtain shares in the new VOs – or to take their compensation and invest it in other 
ventures. If significant numbers of operators choose the latter option, or only invest part of their 
compensation in the new VO, this will result in acceptable levels of profits per share for the 
remaining shareholders. This became known as the policy of compensation. 
 
Termination of taxi licenses 
Legally a taxi operator cannot be forced out of the industry, even with the offer of compensation 
– except where the period of a licence runs out and the City does not support it to be renewed. 
The National Land Transport Act says that cities cannot terminate route licenses at will. The 
only way that a route license may be terminated is through consent of the operator – or to allow 
it to run until it expires. (Business Plan for Phase 1A) 
In Phase 1A, 40% of affected operators have “definite licenses” which in Cape Town means that 
they expire after two years. 60% of affected operators have what are known as “indefinite 
permits.” The industry has come to interpret this as “perpetual permits” although this is incorrect 
since the term indefinite means that the date of termination is simply undefined. The NLTA 
provides that any “indefinite license” will expire automatically in 2016, after which it can be 
renewed on the same basis as definite licences. 
Thus the City has opted to make the offer of compensation favourable to encourage operators to 
choose it rather than to continue operating in competition with IRT. However, if an operator 
does not accept compensation, he or she will face competition from parallel IRT routes and will 
become less profitable. As a way of ensuring that as many operators as possible accept the offer 
of compensation before the IRT system become operational, the City offer of compensation will 
expire, if not taken up. Thus, operators cannot change their minds once faced with competition 
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from the IRT system. For this reason, it is believed likely that most operators will accept 
compensation, but it can be assumed that some will not. 
 
Employment in the new system as VOCs 
One of the main aims of the IRT is to substantially improve the work environment for those 
currently employed. Many of the current drivers and staff are without employment benefits such 
as leave, sick leave, health care, maternity benefits and pensions. The new system will provide 
these benefits as well as safer working conditions, a stable salary and regular working hours 
while enhancing professionalism and career development. 
The City is working to increase overall employment in the public transport sector. In the new 
IRT System there will be opportunities for employment as drivers as well as other fulltime jobs, 
such as in maintenance, customer service and security. Employment is expected to grow because 
of the emphasis on customer safety and quality of services, such as longer hours of operation 
each day. Also, although there will be fewer vehicles than there are currently, there will be 
multiple shifts for drivers. 
At the very least, the IRT System is likely to be employment neutral, when comparing the full 
time jobs in the present transport sector with the planned on-going jobs in the new system. It 
was expected that the drivers and other employees in the VO companies will be drawn mainly 
from the pool of workers in the current system. Also, most of the jobs in the station service 
contract are for station cleaning and maintenance, station security, customer service, and 
ticketing system management, which are compatible with skills of the workers in the minibus-
taxi industry. In addition, the construction of the system itself will generate considerable 
employment.  
 A good example of the limits of the City’s outsourcing/PPP model is what happened when the 
station management was won by a new bidder. The two VOC’s lost the contract to manage 
stations in October 2013. The new (lower priced) contract was awarded to AEM–a joint venture 
comprising of Arcus Facilities Management Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Enforce Security Services 
(Pty) Ltd.  Workers earning a monthly R5700 as ticket validators were retrained as kiosk 
cashiers, but because their working hours had been reduced, their wages were halved.  The City 
claimed it could not intervene in this matter. “We are not able to comment on the private 
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employment relationship between an employer and employees.” (West Cape News, 9 August 
2013). 
Obligations of VO companies 
In the earlier part of the process, when the VO company contracting was intended to contain a 
competitive element, a points system was designed to give preference to the company that 
would employ the most existing employees. Given that the VO company contracts were later to 
be fully negotiated, the City has decided, instead to require the companies to give preferential 
access to jobs to full-time workers in the affected taxi routes and bus industry. To achieve this:  
The City will provide each of the VO companies with a register of fulltime 
former taxi-drivers  and their contact details. The station services company, the 
fare system company, the control centre company, and the companies 
contracted to provide non-motorised transport would also receive the list. 
(Council approval MyCiTi Phase 1A, 2010) 
Because the City allows a five year grace period before declaring a license dormant, there are a 
group of operators considered to be “semi-legal.” Semi-legals are operators who have applied 
for licenses that have not been granted because the City’s database shows demand as being 
already met. But because there are so many dormant licenses, the City needs these operators to 
provide service in order to meet demand. So the City does not officially recognize them as legal 
operators but also does not prevent them from operating. Thus, the City cannot only calculate 
the number of vehicles to be scrapped based on licensed vehicles in the system, instead it must 
look at all vehicles supported by an association and then recalculate formula. 
However, many of the semi-legals are currently in disputes with the City for licenses. As a 
result, the City is creating “goodwill” by prioritising routes parallel to the IRT, cancelling 
dormant licenses on those routes and making legal many “semi-legals.”.  The VO Company will 
have to identify the individual taxis to be sold in this manner, and submit an irrevocable 
mandate from the owner of the vehicle that this vehicle will be available for sale in this fashion. 
Another issue in the scrapping requirement is the immediate depreciation of the value of a first-
hand vehicle after it has been purchased. Those who have recently purchased new vehicles 
(again, worth more than R55000) and are now being required to scrap a vehicle (by likely first 
selling their new vehicle) for entry into the system, are doing so at a loss. The City is currently 
investigating methods of counteracting this issue. Another complication could be what happens 
when operators have outstanding payments on their vehicles. It would be unreasonable to force 
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them to sell off their vehicles when they owe money but the City is forcing them to do so. This 
problem has not yet been solved. 
Conclusion and on-going problems 
Community and labour issues are central to the MyCiTi Bus project and to the model where 
some key aspscts of the public service have been privatised. Thus the employees were affiliated 
to South African Transport and Allied Workers Union. Drivers embarked on the strike on the 4 
February 2015. Cosatu encouraged all MyCiTi bus drivers to join about 50 striking workers 
employed by Transpeninsula. Meanwhile, the ANC said the city had failed to compensate taxi 
operators, and R632m was allocated for this in the 2012/13 fiscal year but had still not been 
spent. “Reports have it that only 85 of the 123 operators have been compensated to date,” but 
the City’s Brett Herron said this was incorrect, as the city had in fact paid out about 520 
operating licences and the number was increasing as more taxis withdrew from the inner city.  
The buy-in of taxi owners and associations as well as ensuring their compliance and good 
performance is crucial to the success of the MyCiTi. The taxi-owners had to be convinced and 
compensated to give up their current rights in the Phase 1 in return for shares in the vehicle 
operator companies contracted to operate the new system. The VOCs are contracted to provide 
an efficient level of service and are subject to penalties for infringements.  Once compensated 
taxi-owners would lose their licenses and would not compete with buses. However, the entire 
move has turned out to be extremely complex with the city having to amend its positions 
pragmatically as it went along but perhaps at the expense of the publicness and integrity of the 
system. Taxi-owners similarly changed their views and upped their demands.  
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Chapter 6: Lessons and Conclusions  
The research for this mini thesis aimed to uncover the complexities of the MyCiTi project 
looking at the major local stakeholders; their interests and views;  how has the model evolved 
and how stakeholders’ views been modified and finally what lessons might be learnt? As is 
evident there a many difficulties and hundreds of ways in which MyCiTi could still fail. In this 
final chapter, we draw on reflections by actors themselves in 2014 and provide additional 
comment on problems surfacing in 2014 among stakeholders.  
In 2014, in looking back at MyCiTi project, Melissa Whitehead (2014) a key strategist for the 
city in the IRT architecture and planning drew four key lessons as follows: 
No public transport service in the world runs at a profit, let alone in a South 
African city where the poor are marginalized and placed far from places of 
employment, sometimes between 45-70km away. (Our) biggest operational 
challenge is higher bus occupancies while maintaining passenger expectations 
and ensuring the utilisation of existing assets. ...The original revenue projection 
was substantially out.  
She further notes that, “the infrastructure standards must be standardised across the City so as to 
ensure that there is quality service delivery. Communication, she notes,  is critical. Demetrius 
Dudley of the African Christian Democratic Party making an economic argument, for scaling 
back the project, noted that “the biggest lesson to learnt from all this is that if other bus 
operators were not offering a service on certain routes, surely the first thought would have been 
that those routes were not financially viable”. (May 1, 2015, Independent online, IOL myciti-
facing-r52m-deficit). 
A key informant in the City (Interview 1, 2014) expressed the view that the most severe 
challenges could come from future labour disputes because the City does not directly employ 
MyCiTi personnel and drivers. The key informant indirectly spoke to the problem of PPP’s (see 
chapter one of this thesis) and the risks of having an external service provider who interacts with 
the public on behalf of the City. For example between January and July 2014, 15 drivers had 
been dismissed by their companies following accidents or for being drunk, staying away from 
work and not taking proper care of buses (Cape Times, 7 August 2014). In 2014, 200 penalties 
to the value of R198 000  were imposed on the three VOCs: Transpeninsula Investments, Table 
Bay Area Rapid Transit (TBRT) and Kidrogen – who are operating the MyCiTi service in the 
inner-city area, Montague Gardens, Atlantis, Melkbosstrand, Dunoon, Salt River and Hout Bay. 
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These penalties, imposed from 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2014, have been paid to the City. 
They relate to schedule adherence, employee conduct, and compliance, amongst others. 
Companies have to discipline workers themselves and then report to the City. 
Tony Ehrenreich, leader of the ANC in the city, and advocate for commuters on the Cape Flats 
and working-class areas, like Melissa Whitehead) has pointed to the disparity between the the 
quality of services rolled out to Table View and Mitchells Plain. An interesting paradox is that 
city buses are “mostly full of domestic workers on their way to work in Camps Bay and staff 
working at the cable car.” http://mybroadband.co.za/vb/showthread.php/712174-MyCiTi-Bus-
price-increased-up-to-43-in-Cape-Town/page3.  
Attempts to moderate the system (a euphemism for cutting back services or lowering service 
quality) to ensure that it remains financially viable might undermine the public perception of 
equity and the quality of the MyCiTi system for all. Building less expensive infrastructure in the 
future will feed perceptions that the first phase services mainly advantaged affluent areas. 
It must be remembered that MyCiTi is a nest of contracts (a complex multiple PPP) with many 
private players attending to different parts of the system while trying to make as much money as 
possible within the prescribed rules. The three VOCs (previously taxi owners and GABS) have 
been guaranteed a return of 15% profit per annum. The overall deal for a 12 year contract with 
one company alone (Kidrogen) is around R4,5 billion (Western Cape Government 2013). The 
stakes are huge and as is often the case the risk is borne by the taxpayer (socialised via the 
public) and the profits are appropriated privately (Harvey 1989).  
As also observed, using the principal-agent theory, much of the success of a PPP requires co-
ordinated efforts between players and a high trust environment as well as keen oversight by the 
City, which as the principal has to monitor the companies on a daily basis. Legal intricacies and 
failed plans with one contractor could mean that contracts are either cancelled or renegotiated 
and there could be numerous knock on effects of failure in one area (for instance the MyCiTi 
control centre). The control centre with a tender worth around R250 million provides a good 
instance. Here ‘numerous intricacies have to be concluded (with a new company) to get the 
control centre to operate as was originally specified. Once fully operational, the control centre 
will be able to provide commuters with real-time information about the MyCiTi service during 
its hours of service” (Transport For Cape Town 14 April 2015).  MyCiTi has appealed for 
passengers to provide information and report problems. But the cost of getting information to 
monitor implementing agents and punish them is typically far more than expected given that 
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implementers often have more knowledge about how to take short cuts. These are classic issues 
of principals and agent dynamics and moral hazard. The City has been anxious to show it has the 
capacity and will to regulate the VOC’s and other agents to whom it has outsourced activities. 
“These penalties and dismissals demonstrate that we are holding our VOCs to their contractual 
operating standards and obligations, despite the fact that the MyCiTi Control Centre is not yet 
operating as designed” (Transport For Cape Town, 2014). The BRT concept was sold to the 
national government on the premise that no recurrent operating subsidies would be required. 
However, it is now clear that the BRT system will indeed require a higher subsidy than its 
predecessor.  
The overall model of public-private partnership presents a number of problems chiefly related to 
monitoring and evaluation, and information problems that arise when the principal stakeholder 
(the city) has to regulate the private external agents.  
A final crucial set of issues is related to the middle class use of the system reducing the private 
car orientation of the middle class, congestion and limiting the ecological damage caused by 
motor vehicles. The MyCiTi bus has so far failed to make a dent in the divided social geography 
and racial space of the City.  The airport shuttle -- which middle class air travellers and tourists 
could use -- has been a failure (the busses run close to empty every thirty minutes for almost 15 
hours a day (interview May 2015). 
The private car orientation of the middle class is understandable but not desirable. Effective and 
high quality public transport systems could as a catalyst for more social cohesion,, non-racialism 
and more sustainable urban communities, which are less reliant on private cars. Safety and 
security forms an integral part of the BRT system for all passengers but also for the middle class 
who have pronounced fears. Closed circuit cameras, monitored by the controlled centre should 
be used to easily deploy patrols should the need arises. The absence of effective visible policing 
and law enforcement is an indication that an element has been overlooked. However, with the 
middle class for the most part refusing to ‘buy in’ to MyCiTi, it will become stigmatised as a 
working class form of transport.  The shift to a public transport life style might require a 
fundamental reshaping of the city and its political economy and a reversal of its orientation to 
investors.  
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Appendix I: List of all interviews 
Interview No 1 (anon), senior official in transport dept COCT, August 2014  
Interview No 1 (b) Second Interview November 2015 
Interview No 2, Taxi drivers ,City of Cape Town station 
Interview 3, Tony Ehrenreich,  29 August 2014 
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Appendix II 
Guide Interview Questions: 
1. What were your initial fears about BRT and do you think that the BRT has brought about 
significant improvement in terms of safety and efficiency in the transport services provision 
in the city? 
 2. Comparing the two systems the (old and new), as a stakeholder are you satisfied with the 
integration phased process? 
3.  Four years down the line, have your views changed… about what aspects and to what 
extent? 
 4.   Do you feel that an adequate consultation process was followed with the introduction of the 
IRT/MyCiTi? 
5. Are there any conflicts of interest between different groups of members (e.g. taxi members 
vs. public bus company drivers, between employers over routes, between long distance taxi 
companies and others).   
 6. What has the organisation done to meet these needs or address these interests? 
How has this changed over the last year? How has this changed over the last five          
years? 
 
7.  Do you believe the system now implemented would be sustainable for the next 10 years. 
8. In your view, how do we compare to international cities operating the IRT’s. 
9. What has been the major lessons learned in the rollout process. Where are the big risks? 
10. What logistical gaps have you found in the purchase of the MyCiTi cards in relation to 
cash payment methods. 
11. How has your income been affected with the introduction of MyCiTi and  IRT. 
14. Did you at any time feel positive about the system and which aspects.  
15. What were your initial views of the future in your aspect of the industry. 
16. Can you brief me, on the data reporting systems planned vs the current operating data 
used. 
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17. What quality assurance system is in place to monitor the continual development. 
18. What was the  initial budget that was appropriated for the system and how has this 
budget been escalated.  
19.    How does the data reporting system cater for the misappropriation of funds.  Is it working 
according to plan, and what costs are incurred in monitoring VOCS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
